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MANDATING MEANINGFUL FORENSIC DISCOVERY:
A PROPOSAL TO FUEL THE ENGINE OF TRUTHFULNESS
MARJORIE ANNE MCDIARMID*
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of disclosure of forensic frauds,1 discrediting of previous forensic
techniques,2 and exonerations of innocents incarcerated for crimes they did not
commit,3 in 2009, at the behest of Congress,4 the National Academies of Science5
published a thoughtful, but devastating critique of the practice of forensic science
in the criminal courts of the United States. Its report—Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward6—called for congressional and
administrative action to correct the problems identified. Despite efforts by three
leading senators, no comprehensive legislation was passed.7 The Obama
administration, on the other hand, took a number of steps to address issues raised
in the report.8
* Steptoe & Johnson Professor of Law and Technology at the West Virginia University
College of Law; JD, cum laude, Columbia University School of Law (1970), LLM, Harvard Law
School (1974). Faculty member: West Virginia University LLM in Forensic Justice. Founder of the
West Virginia Clinical Law Program Innocence Project. 
The author would like to thank Scott Curnutte, Joshua Fershee, William Ihlenfeld, John
Taylor, Melanie Stimeling, and Casper Venter for their advice and suggestions on this paper. Their
help was invaluable; the mistakes are mine. 
1. See discussion infra Part II.D.
2. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
3. See Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.
innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ [https://perma.cc/P7SX-CGZJ] (last
visited May 14, 2018). 
4. Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (Nov. 22, 2005). 
5. The National Academies of Science through the National Research Council is a private
research group operating under a charter granted by Congress. It conducts many studies of, and
publishes recommendations on, an array of public issues.
6. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVX5-S7FM] [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
7. Senator Jay Rockefeller authored the Forensic Science and Standards Act, S. 2022, 113th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2014). That bill was reported from committee in 2014, but never made it to the
Senate floor. Senators Patrick Leahy and John Cornyn authored Criminal Justice and Forensic
Science Reform Act, S. 2177, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014). That bill died in committee.
8. The administration created two entities to seek remedies to the problems identified in the
NAS Report. See notes 10 and 11 infra. In addition, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
issued a thorough report with substantive recommendations in this field. See generally PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic
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In one of the Trump administration’s first actions, on April 10, 2017,
Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions announced9 his intention not to renew the
charter of the National Commission on Forensic Science.10 In doing so, Sessions
removed one of the two11 entities fashioned by the Obama administration to
address the shortcomings of forensic science in the United States. 
With abdication now on the part of both Congress and the Executive, this
paper suggests that it is time to give the Judiciary—judges and lawyers—the tools
to address an important subset of the issues raised in the NAS Report. 
Before the Sessions decision, the National Commission had recommended
that the Department of Justice12 dramatically increase the scope of the
Department’s policy with respect to pre-trial discovery of forensic material in
federal criminal cases. Justice had agreed13 to do so. As we will see below, that
increase in scope is critical to addressing problems of forensic malpractice and
fraud14 in this country. However, the problem with this recommendation is that
it is an internal policy of the last administration of the Department of Justice,
subject to exactly the same change of administration that killed the entity that
proposed it.15 What is needed is a systemic change to Rule 16 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure,16 both at the federal and state level.17 This Article will
_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV4C-J8X4] [hereinafter the PCAST REPORT]. 
9. Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New Initiative to Advance Forensic Science
and Help Counter the Rise in Violent Crime, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiatives-advance-forensic-
science-and-help [https://perma.cc/RA2L-98AS].
10. The National Commission on Forensic Science was a creation of the Department of
Justice under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Charter of the National
Commission on Forensic Science (Apr. 23, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/
archives/ncfs/file/624216/download [https://perma.cc/8A2S-DMJC].  The Commission was created
as part of the federal response to the crisis in forensic science identified by the NAS Report.
11. The other entity is the Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) which is a
joint creature of the Department of Justice and the National Institute of Science and Technology.
See Dep’t of Justice & Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Memorandum of Understanding in
Support of the National Commission of Forensic Science and the Organization of Scientific Area
Committees (2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/761051/download
[https://perma.cc/895U-ZEUR] [hereinafter Memo of Understanding].
12. See NAT’L COMMISSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY OF FORENSIC MATERIALS (Aug. 11, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/
file/786611/download [https://perma.cc/2T7U-G4CM].
13. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum for Department Prosecutors (Jan. 5, 2017),
available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/930411/download [https://perma.cc/
QJX5-S8D7] [hereinafter Yates Memo].  
14. See discussion infra Parts II.C-D.
15. As we will see infra text accompanying notes 250-57, no action appears to have been
taken to implement the Justice Department policy issued in the waning days of the Obama
administration.
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Rule 16 together with provisions in Rule 16 and Rule 12 governs
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explore the need for this change18 and the history19 and shortcomings20 of the
current Rule 16. Finally, it will propose amendments to the Rule to address these
problems.21
The first question is whether there is a problem with forensic science which
needs to be addressed. That question was answered in 2009. As noted above, the
National Academies of Science22 studied the state of forensic science beginning
in 2005. The NAS Report paints a dismal picture of current forensic theory and
practice.23 In his prepared testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Report, the Report committee’s co-chair--the Honorable Harry Edwards--
characterized the current state of forensic science as, “[a] system plagued by a
paucity of good research, fragmentation, inconsistent practices, and weak
governance.”24
I will set forth a taxonomy of the problems identified because, as I will
suggest below, different problems are more or less amenable to amelioration by
expanded discovery. Broadly, problems with forensic science can be broken into
four: (1) unsupported claims of individualization25 (e.g., the fact that the
defendant owns bullets, hairs, teeth, etc., that are like those found at the crime
scene means that he was at the crime scene), (2) unsupported claims that evidence
points to the fact that a crime has occurred (e.g., arson), (3) work done by
unqualified, untrained or sloppy technicians which invites the possibility of error
(e.g., use of unaccredited laboratories or maintenance of the elected coroner
pretrial discovery in criminal cases.
17. Many states pattern their rules of procedure on the analogous federal rule.
18. See discussion on taxonomy of forensic problems infra Part II.
19. See discussion on current interpretation of Rule 16 infra Part IV.  
20. See discussion on current interpretation of Rule 16 infra Part IV.  
21. See discussion on amendment of Rule 16 infra Part VII.
22. The Academy is chartered by Congress and is a not-for-profit organization whose purpose
it is to study scientific questions. The Academy has created the National Research Council to
conduct research which can be used in advising the federal government. References to the report
on forensics sometimes refer to it as the NAS report and sometimes call it the NRC report,
reflecting the two groups.
23. NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at xx (“The forensic science system, encompassing both
research and practice, has serious problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment
to overhaul the current structure that supports the forensic science community in this country.”) 
24. Harry Edwards, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward,
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, MED. (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.nationalacademies.org/
OCGA/111Session1/testimonies/OCGA_149970   [https://perma.cc/9WJ7-YR2K]. The NAS report
went on to state, “With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.” NAS REPORT,
supra note 6, at 7.
25. The use of the term “individualization” to describe this claim occurs in Simon A. Cole,
Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for
Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, 13 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 117, 117 (2004).
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system), and (4) deliberate fraud by technicians (e.g., testifying that blood found
at the scene of a crime matches that of the defendant when it does not or
testifying that the technician has conducted laboratory tests which, in fact, the
technician has not conducted).
II. TAXONOMY OF PROBLEMS WITH FORENSIC SCIENCE
A. Claims of Individualization
The first problem actually embeds two questions: first, how do we know that
something is like something else, and, second, is this similarity, if it exists,
meaningful. For too many of the forensic sciences, neither of these questions are
answered. On the first question, examiners, for example, have been unable or
unwilling to articulate the criteria for a “match” in even such a venerable field as
fingerprint identification.26 
On the second question, few meaningful studies have been conducted on
whether genuinely matching evidence is sufficiently rare to tell us anything about
the likelihood that finding such a match supports a claim of proof of presence at
the crime scene. For example, if oxygen is present in the defendant’s blood and
is also found at the crime scene, we would not say that the presence of oxygen
linked the defendant to the crime because oxygen is everywhere. Similarly, if
extremely large numbers of lead bullets had identical chemical composition, then
the fact that the defendant has bullets with the same chemical composition as
those found at the crime scene tells us nothing about whether the defendant is
linked to the crime. Yet, up until 2005 when the claim was discredited in another
NAS study—Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence27—technicians
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation were claiming that analysis of bullet
composition could enable them to trace a bullet found at the scene of a crime to
an individual box of bullets found in the possession of the defendant.28 The NAS
report refuted those claims.29 
26. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see generally
SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY AND TECHNOLOGY,
DOCUMENT #10: STANDARDS FOR EXAMINING FRICTION RIDGE IMPRESSIONS AND RESULTING
CONCLUSIONS (LATENT /TENPRINT) (2013), available at http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/
examinations-conclusions/130427_Examinations-Conclusions_2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EYU-
S9PW].
27. See generally COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL
COMPOSITION COMPARISON, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (2004)
[hereinafter BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE].
28. See Scientist and National Academy of Science (NAS) Discredit Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA), SIRCHIE (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.sirchie.com/blog/scientist-and-national-
academy-of-sciences-nas-discredit-comparative-bullet-lead-analysis-cbla/#.Wv8cJkgvw2w
[https://perma.cc/A8KA-QT6V].
29. Id.
The available data do not support any statement that a crime bullet came from a
particular box of ammunition. In particular, references to “boxes” of ammunition in any
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Despite the absence of scientific support for the claims that examiners can
properly identify a match or that a match is meaningful, evidence in most of the
forensic disciplines based on these assumptions has been permitted and has been
relied upon to convict largely unchallenged by the judicial system.30
B. Is There a Crime?
The second problem--posed by the use of erroneous forensic science to
determine whether a crime has occurred at all--is best illustrated by the revolution
in the study of fire which has occurred within the last thirty years.31 Unlike the
role of forensic science in most crimes, where forensics are used to attempt to
identify the perpetrator of a crime that has been proven by other means to have
occurred (theft, supported by the report of the victim, for instance), arson is
frequently charged solely based on the conclusions of the forensic investigation.32
The revolution in proper arson investigation came about because scientists,
from outside the forensic field, were funded with an infusion of federal money in
the 1970s.33 Those funds were used to conduct controlled experiments in fire
form should be avoided as misleading under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 
Compositional analysis of bullet lead data alone also does not permit any definitive
statement concerning the date of bullet manufacture. 
Detailed patterns of the distribution of ammunition are unknown, and as a result, experts
should not testify as to the probability that the crime scene bullet came from the
defendant. Geographic distribution data on bullets and ammunition are needed before
such testimony can be given. BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 27, at 7.
In the face of this conclusion, the FBI abandoned lead bullet testing. FBI Laboratory Announces
Discontinuation of Bullet Lead Examinations, FBI (Sept. 1, 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-lead-
examinations [https://perma.cc/A9XX-KLMS]. 
30. Douglas Starr, Forensics gone wrong: When DNA snares the innocent, SCI. (May 7, 2016,
10:00 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/forensics-gone-wrong-when-dna-snares-
innocent [https://perma.cc/NEM2-JGK6] (Greg Hampikian discusses prosecution and jury believing
DNA evidence as a false or misconstrued match.). 
31. See John J. Lentini, The Evolution of Fire Investigation and its Impact on Arson Cases,
27 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2012).
32. Id.; Paul Bieber, Arson and “Junk Science,” CRIME REPORT (Apr. 3, 2012),
https://thecrimereport.org/2012/04/03/2012-04-arson-and-junk-science/ [https://perma.cc/8YHR-
SEKJ] (“Arson cases are often based on forensic evidence presented in court as irrefutable science,
but which in fact has either never been tested or already proven to be unreliable.”).   
33. Douglas Starr, Spark of Truth: Can Science Bring Justice to Arson Trials, DISCOVER
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://discovermagazine.com/2011/nov/12-spark-truth-science-bring-justice-arson-
trials [https://perma.cc/92ZA-4XFG]. For a description of the National Institute of Science and
Technology fire research facility, see National Fire Research Laboratory, NIST, https://www.nist.
gov/el/fire-research-division-73300/national-fire-research-laboratory-73306 [https://perma.cc/
H9KD-F2KS] (last visited May 18, 2018). 
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behavior, leading to the rejection of many beliefs that had been firmly held by
arson investigators. The result of those experiments has overturned what was
previously believed about the observations that would support a conclusion that
a fire was deliberately set.34 
The real world consequences of those discredited old beliefs is set forth in the
report of the Texas Forensic Commission, which looked into the convictions of
Cameron Todd Willingham (executed in 2004) and Ernest Ray Willis (exonerated
in that same year).35 That report contrasts the arson investigator’s testimony at the
trials of these two men with the findings of fire science. Each piece of evidence
relied on in those trials to support the conclusion of arson is now known to be
completely consistent with an accidental fire.36 Despite the fact that the U.S.
Justice Department has recognized the validity of these new findings as far back
as 2000,37 people are still incarcerated and, in Willingham’s case killed, on the
basis of these discredited beliefs.38
C. Lack of Qualifications and Sloppy Practice
The third type of forensic science problem is posed by unqualified or sloppy
practitioners. Apart from outright fraud, substantial injustice can occur through
lack of expertise and sloppy work. Two major investigations of crime labs in
large metropolitan regions in the last several years illustrate the problems that
flow from lack of expert qualifications and improper or deficient use of
appropriate scientific methods.39 The first of these arose in a scandal at the
34. See generally Lentini, supra note 31 (discussing evolving fire investigation methods).
35. See generally REPORT OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION:
WILLINGHAM/WILLIS INVESTIGATION (2011), available at http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TQC-H7CG] [hereinafter WILLINGHAM/WILLIS INVESTIGATION].
Texas has a state agency, the Forensic Commission, charged with monitoring the claims of forensic
science in that State.
36. Id. at 21-37.
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
PERSONNEL (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181584.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H2P5-VXYU] (citing the NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NFPA 921), GUIDE FOR FIRE AND
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS (1992) as the “benchmark” for arson determinations). 
In 1992, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) issued NFPA 921: Guide for
Fire and Explosion Investigations, a consensus document reflecting the knowledge and
experience of fire, engineering, legal, and investigative experts across the United States.
This document is continuously reviewed, public proposals and comments are solicited,
and a revised edition is produced every 3 to 5 years. It has become a benchmark for the
training and expertise of everyone who purports to be an expert in the origin and cause
determination of fires. Id. at 6.
38. WILLINGHAM/WILLIS INVESTIGATION, supra note 35, at 10. 
39. See News and Information, HPDLABINVESTIGATION.ORG, http://www.
hpdlabinvestigation.org/ [https://perma.cc/2LAX-6AM9] [hereinafter Houston Lab Investigation]
(last visited May 18, 2018); MICHIGAN STATE POLICE FORENSIC SCIENCE DIVISION, AUDIT OF THE
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT FORENSIC SERVICES LABORATORY FIREARMS UNIT (2008), available
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Houston Police Crime Lab.40 That investigation found a few instances of
deliberate fraud by two technicians at the lab,41 but most of the 599 cases that
outside investigators identified as requiring corrective action were caused by lack
of proper performance and sloppy work.42 These cases were selected because the
defendants involved were all in prison, four on death row.43 The investigators
described the scope of the cases requiring corrective action as follows:
Based on the findings of our review of 850 serology cases processed by
the Crime Lab between 1980 and 1992 and which relate to a defendant
who currently is in prison, we make the following recommendations.
HPD must determine whether evidence currently exists and can be
located in the following categories of cases:
(1) Cases (274) in which evidence was screened positively for blood
or semen, but no ABO typing was performed;
(2) Cases (139) in which the Crime Lab performed ABO typing on
at http://www.sado.org/content/pub/10559_MSP-DCL-Audit.pdf [https://perma.cc/32GS-NFRH]
[hereinafter DETROIT REPORT]. 
40. Problems in the lab were originally identified by local news media, which in consultation
with outside experts, carried a series of stories criticizing the lab. That publicity lead to a request
by the Chief of Police for an outside investigation. See Houston Lab Investigation, supra note 39.
The Houston lab, as a result of this investigation was removed from the supervision of the police
department and is now an independent forensic laboratory. Its reputation has markedly improved.
See HOUS. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/ [https://perma.cc/6FQU-
8D8M] (last visited May 18, 2018).
41. MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR THE
HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND PROPERTY ROOM 5, 153-57 (2007),
available at http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/070613report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC2N-
VR3S] [hereinafter HOUSTON REPORT].
42. Id. at 12, 92.
43. The Houston Report stated the following: 
We identified major issues in the DNA analysis performed by the Crime Lab in four
death penalty cases . . . . The Crime Lab’s historical DNA casework reflects a wide
range of serious problems ranging from poor documentation to serious analytical and
interpretive errors that resulted in highly questionable results being reported by the Lab.
The profound weaknesses and flawed practices that were prevalent in the Crime Lab’s
DNA work include the absence of a quality assurance program, inadequately trained
analysts, poor analytical technique, incorrect interpretations of data, the characterizing
of results as “inconclusive” when that was not the case, and the lack of meaningful and
competent technical reviews. Furthermore, the potential for the Crime Lab’s analysis
of biological evidence to result in a miscarriage of justice was amplified exponentially
by the Lab’s reported conclusions, frequently accompanied by inaccurate and
misleading statistics, that often suggested a strength of association between a suspect
and the evidence that simply was not supported by the analyst’s actual DNA results.
Id. at 4-5.
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evidence samples, but no comparison to known reference samples
was made;
(3) Cases (6) in which DNA analysis performed contemporaneously
by an outside laboratory failed to include the suspect; and
(4) All cases (180) we identified as containing a major issue with the
reliability of the Crime Lab’s work or the accuracy of its reported
results.44
The report goes on to recommend efforts at corrective action.45 The outside
investigators summarized their findings as follows:
We found that the serology work that the Crime Lab did actually perform
during the 1980-1992 period was generally unreliable. We found major
issues calling into question the reliability of the serology work performed
by the Crime Lab or the accuracy of the results it reported in 180 -- 21%
-- of the serology cases we reviewed that relate to a defendant who is
currently in prison. This is an extraordinarily high and extremely
disturbing proportion of cases in which to find problems of this
magnitude.46
In a section entitled Detailed Case Studies, the investigators reviewed four
specific convictions which were based in significant part upon the evidence
supplied by the laboratory.47 Two of the defendants involved had been exonerated
before the external investigation occurred.48 In one of the cases studied, the
defendant was still incarcerated.49 In all cases, the investigators identified serious
deficiencies on the part of the lab including statistically faulty and misleading
testimony and errors in conducting tests.50 In both of the cases where the
defendants were exonerated, the investigators concluded that proper forensic
testing would have and ultimately did result in identification of the true
perpetrator.51 Thus, not only did errors lead to the conviction of an innocent
person, but those same errors also left the true perpetrator free to further prey
upon the community.52
The second investigation occurred in Detroit where the firearms section of the
crime lab was investigated at the request of the chief of police by an independent
investigator and by the Michigan State Patrol.53 In this investigation, 250
44. Id. at 11-12.
45. See generally id.   
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id. at 187-217.
48. Id. at 202-03, 214-16 (cases of Rodriguez and Sutton cases). 
49. Id. at 193 (Napper case). 
50. Id. at 187-233.
51. Id. at 203-04, 217-19.
52. Id. at 187-233. 
53. See generally DETROIT REPORT, supra note 39. This audit was performed by an
independent investigator in conjunction with the Michigan State Police. 
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randomly selected closed cases were re-tested.54 In those cases, the investigators
identified twenty cases in which the Detroit lab had wrongly identified bullets as
coming from a particular gun.55 This type of error, denominated a Class I error,
potentially results in an innocent person being convicted.56 From that same
sample of 250 cases, the investigators found five errors in which the Detroit lab
had failed to link bullets to the gun which had, in fact, fired them.57 This is a
Class II error, potentially resulting in a guilty party being cleared.58 The overall
error rate on these randomly selected cases was 10%.59 More troubling, the same
tests were run on thirty-three recently adjudicated cases.60 Here the error rate was
even higher, 12%, and all the errors were Class I.61 Thus, from thirty-thee cases,
four showed errors by the Detroit lab which wrongly linked bullets to a particular
firearm and, thus, a potentially innocent defendant.62 Finally, the Michigan State
Crime lab ran tests on eighty firearms in cases which were then pending in the
courts.63 The same pattern prevailed with a 10% overall error rate, with nine Class
I errors and one Class II error.64 
The report of the investigators attributed these errors to a failure to adhere to
recognized standards, a lack of training, improper supervision, lack of support,
and bad working conditions.65 The standards against which the Detroit lab was
measured are found in the accreditation criteria for forensic laboratories.66
D. Fraud
The final source of error in our taxonomy is fraud. I am using that term here
54. Id. at 4-5.
55. See id. at 5-8.
56. Id. at 4-5.
57. Id. at 5-8.
58. Id. at 4, 8.
59. Id. at 4 (as applicable to firearms cases). 
60. Id. at 9-11. 
61. Id. at 8-9. There were no Class II errors among the adjudicated cases.
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 9-10.
65. Id. at 4-5.
66. ASCLAD/LAB is a forensic lab accrediting agency provided those standards. Id. at 4.
One of the beneficial byproducts of the NAS Report is that the National Commission on Forensic
Science has recommended (in May 2015) and the U.S. Justice Department has agreed that by 2020
U.S. Attorneys must use, whenever practicable, accredited forensic testing entities when they
request testing of evidence. See Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for
Heads of Department Components (Nov. 23, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/
ncfs/file/799001/download [https://perma.cc/S8AZ-UVA2]. On the other hand, accreditation by
itself does not guarantee a lab free of problems. See Mark Hansen, Crime labs under the
Microscope after a string of shoddy, suspect and fraudulent results, ABA J. (Sept. 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/crime_labs_under_the_microscope_after_a_string
_of_shoddy_suspect_and_fraudu/ [https://perma.cc/FDK5-H7M6].
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in its technical sense: a deliberate lie told with the intent to deceive. Below are
four examples of intentional forensic fraud which occurred in four jurisdictions
throughout the country.67
The first of these to come to light was the misconduct of Fred S. Zain, first
of the West Virginia State Police crime lab and then, briefly, of the Bexar County
lab in Texas.68 Trooper Zain was consistently able to “find” traces of blood or
semen matching the blood group of the defendant at crime scenes.69 In fact, he
was so good at it, that after he moved from West Virginia to Texas, West Virginia
police and prosecutors sent him cases where other technicians had failed to find
evidence supporting the police theory of the crime.70 
Zain’s testimony was instrumental in convicting a man named Glen Dale
Woodall for two widely publicized rapes in Huntington, West Virginia.71
Unfortunately for Trooper Zain’s credibility, DNA testing became available
within several years after the Woodall conviction, and Mr. Woodall’s attorney
was able to convince the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to grant his
motion for post-conviction DNA testing by two independent labs.72 Those DNA
tests excluded Mr. Woodall as the rapist.73 The results also made it “highly
unlikely” that Zain’s testimony on blood type was accurate.74 After the
appointment of a Special Judge to investigate and a thorough audit of the crime
lab, it was established that Trooper Zain had committed systematic fraud in many
cases by altering the record of test results from those actually obtained.75 The
67. The Innocence Project estimates that forty-five percent of DNA exonerations involve
some problem with forensic evidence. Misapplication of Forensic Science, supra note 3. They do
not identify how many of those involved fraud. Id. The National Registry of Exonerations says that
nearly one-quarter of exonerations involve “[f]alse or misleading forensic evidence” ranging from
“simple mistakes to invalid techniques to outright fraud.” NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012, at 63 (2012), available at https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U39P-RPWM]. 
68. Sau Chan, Scores of Convictions Reviewed as Chemist Faces Perjury Accusations:
Forensics: Fred Zain's expert testimony and lab tests helped put scores of rapists and murderers
behind bars. But college transcript shows he flunked some chemistry classes and barely passed
others. He is also accused of evidence-tampering, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 1994), http://articles.
la t im es . com/1994-08-21 /news/mn-29449_1_lab-tests-fred-zain-dou ble -m u rder
[https://perma.cc/HU4C-5XQF].
69. Id. 
70. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div. (WV Crime Lab
Investigation), 438 S.E.2d 501, 512-13 (W. Va. 1993).
71. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 258 (W. Va., 1989).
72. WV Crime Lab Investigation, 438 S.E.2d, at 503 n.2.
73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES
IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xvii (1996) [hereinafter
CONVICTED BY JURIES]. This report is an excellent source on early DNA exonerations.
74. Id.
75. ASCLAD/LAB, INVESTIGATION REPORT: WEST VIRGINIA STATE POLICE CRIME
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West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals entered a series of corrective orders
after this experience, the first of which held that in any case where Zain’s work
was involved, there was a presumption of fraud: 
It is believed that, as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary
evidence offered by Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should
be deemed invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible in determining whether
to award a new trial in any subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.76
A similar case arose out of the Oklahoma City crime lab.77 In another rape
case, Joyce Gilchrist, a chemist in the Oklahoma City crime lab, testified at the
trial of Mr. Jeffrey Pierce that samples of his hair matched hairs found at the
crime scene and suppressed the fact that an enzyme found in Mr. Pierce’s blood
precluded him as the source of semen found at the scene.78 Post-conviction DNA
testing established that Mr. Pierce was not the rapist.79 In another case, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that Ms. Gilchrist had “provided
flawed laboratory analysis and documentation of her work.”80 The Court also
found that Ms. Gilchrist had “altered lab reports and handwritten notes in an
effort to prevent detection of misconduct.”81 In yet another case, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit set aside the death penalty in part because the
defense did not receive, pre-trial, a lab report from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation showing that no DNA evidence linked the defendant with semen
found at the crime scene.82 The court also found that the defense did not receive
copies of Ms. Gilchrist’s notes of her conversation with the FBI agent confirming
that the defendant was excluded by this DNA test.83 Not only was this
exculpatory evidence withheld, but Ms. Gilchrist then went on, on the basis of
LABORATORY, SEROLOGY DIVISION, SOUTH CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA 7 (1993), available at
https://www.convictingtheinnocent.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/daivs-d-crime-lab.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DB3J-HDF8].
In some instances, results recorded on the case worksheets differed from the results
recorded on the data sheets. This took the form either of a conclusive result recorded on
the case worksheet with a different conclusive result recorded on the data sheet, or of
a conclusive result recorded on the worksheet when the data sheet reflected an
inconclusive or no result obtained . . . . Worksheets reflected alterations in entries which
caused the result to differ from that on the data sheet, although the entry appeared to
have originally agreed with the data sheet. In some instances both worksheets and data
sheets showed alterations to the same result. No record was available to show when or
by whom those alterations were made. Id. at 7.
76. WV Crime Lab Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 506, 520. 
77. See generally Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
78. Id. at 1282.
79. Id. at 1282-83. 
80. McCarty v. State, 114 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
81. Id.
82. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 2001).
83. See id. at 1063.
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inaccurate serology testimony, to link the defendant with that crime scene
evidence.84 In all of these cases, evidence of misconduct was in Ms. Gilchrist’s
files but was not made available until after the convictions were examined in
post-conviction proceedings.85 In a preliminary report by the Oklahoma State
Bureau of Investigation reviewing the cases in which Gilchrist’s work was
implicated, 196 of 1,600 were identified as needing further review.86
More recently in 2011, a chemist at the Massachusetts forensic drug
laboratory was found to have engaged in “dry labbing,” that is, reporting results
of tests that were never run.87 This conduct has recently resulted in the
overturning of 20,000 convictions in which her work was critical to a conviction
at trial or a guilty plea.88 Annie Dookhan’s misconduct came to light as a result
of an audit conducted after a change of management of the lab.89 The audit
revealed that evidence was missing from the secure locker at the laboratory and
that Ms. Dookhan had forged the authorization from the custodian in charge.90
Ms. Dookhan then admitted to “dry-labbing” for two years.91 More recently,
similar allegations have arisen concerning a New Jersey lab technician,
Kamalkant Shah, accused of failing to conduct tests on material believed to be
marijuana prior to preparing reports claiming that such tests were performed.92
In an example that falls somewhere between bad practice and fraud is that
involving the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation.93 The Bureau had a
84. Id. at 1063-64.
85. See generally McCarty, 114 P.3d. 1089; Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.
2004); Mitchell, 262 F.3d 1036. 
86. Diana Baldwin, Gilchrist case report sent to governor, NEWSOK (July 17, 2002, 12:00
AM), https://newsok.com/article/1056685/gilchrist-case-report-sent-to-governor?
[https://perma.cc/28C6-2A7V] The report was sealed. 
87. See Supreme Judicial Court Dismisses Over 21,000 Cases Affected by the Breach at the
Hinton State Laboratory Institute, MASS.GOV (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.mass.gov/courts/news-
pubs/sjc/sjc-dismisses-thousands-of-cases-affected-by-hinton-state-laboratory-breach.html
[https://perma.cc/AEX6-2FS6]
88. See id.; see also Bridgeman v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 67 N.E.3d 673, 694-95
(2017).
89. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., INVESTIGATION OF THE
DRUG LABORATORY AT THE WILLIAM A. HINTON STATE LABORATORY INSTITUTE 2002-2012, at
64 (2014), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/msp/crimelab/investigation-of-the-drug-
labora tory-a t - t h e -w il l iam -a-h in ton -s t a t e -labora tory-in s t i t u t e -2 0 0 2 -2 0 1 2 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/A25L-HYX6] [hereinafter HINTON REPORT].  
90. Id. at 55, 65.  
91. Id. at 5.
92. See Glenn A. Grant, Administrative Order to the Courts, Supreme Court of New Jersey
(Apr. 25, 2016), available at https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2016/n160426a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M693-MJBD]. 
93. CHRIS SWECKER & MICHAEL WOLF, AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE SBI FORENSIC
LABORATORY 3 (2004), available at http://www.ncids.com/forensic/labs/Swecker_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4KU-M8NV].  
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practice94 of reporting preliminary tests for blood but not disclosing the fact that
subsequent, more accurate tests either established that no blood was present or
were inconclusive. This practice resulted in at least one case in the conviction of
a man subsequently exonerated by the North Carolina Innocence Commission.95
In a way this example is the most alarming of all. This was not one technician
stretching the truth to obtain a conviction. This was apparently a conscious
decision by an entire lab to hide the truth about the results of their work when
those results might be helpful to the defense.
III. FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS
For purposes of this discussion, the most telling feature of the problems
discussed above is that none of them came to light as a result of trial court
litigation. The unsubstantiated claims of scientific method (bullet lead and arson)
were debunked by scientific inquiry from outside the forensic community.96 The
cases of fraud were identified in post-conviction proceedings (either habeas or
civil litigation)97 or by administrative findings.98 The problems of shoddy work
in the labs were identified by supervisors and confirmed by outside
investigators.99 One can make an argument, as we will discuss below, that trial
courts are a poor forum to explore the underlying validity of scientific claims. But
surely fraud, lack of qualification, and failures to follow procedure should be grist
for the kind of cross-examination with which all trial lawyers are familiar. Why
have they not been discovered at the trial court level?
Let’s look first at a case in which trial counsel did uncover questionable
practice on the part of a crime lab. Michigan has a medical marijuana statute
which permits the possession of small quantities of many forms of marijuana
including marijuana-infused products in solid form by medically approved
94. Id.
95. The Innocence Inquiry Commission is unique to North Carolina. It is a State agency
charged with adjudicating claims of actual innocence. If the commission is convinced of the
applicant’s innocence, it recommends to a three-judge panel that a finding of innocence be made.
Gregory Flynt Taylor was exonerated using this procedure. See Robbie Brown, Judges Free Inmate
on Recommendation of Special Innocence Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), https://www.
nytimes.com/2010/02/18/us/18innocent.html [https://perma.cc/J7Z5-XPJ2]; see also Paul C.
Giannelli, Department, Scientific Evidence, The North Carolina Crime Lab Scandal, 27 CRIM.
JUST. 43, 43 (2012).
96. The National Academy of Sciences debunked the bullet lead analysis which had been
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See generally BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra
note 27. The modern fire science experiments were conducted under independent grants by the
National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST). See supra text accompanying notes 33, 37.
The National Fire Protection Association Standard 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations
as the “benchmark” for arson determinations grew from this research.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 70-86.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 87-95 (at least came about due to a change in
administration in the lab). 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 35-67.
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patients.1 0 0  Those products contain naturally-occurring Delta-9-
Tetrahydrocannabinol (commonly referred to as THC), which is a constituent of
marijuana.101 The statute did not permit the possession of synthetic THC, which
was still treated as a schedule I felony.102 A holder of a medical marijuana card
was charged with synthetic marijuana possession because he was apprehended
with brown oil, which was sent to the crime lab.103 He was originally charged
with a misdemeanor to which he refused to plead.104 The prosecutor withdrew that
charge and substituted a felony based on a lab report, which said that the oil
contained “delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol Schedule 1 (origin unknown).”105 Using
the Michigan Freedom of Information Act, the defendant’s counsel was able to
discover an e-mail exchange among lab personnel on the proper policy for
reporting results of tests showing THC when plant material could not be
identified in the sample.106 The correspondence contained messages from the
Attorney General’s office and references to a meeting with the state prosecutors’
association.107 Some of the lab technicians argued strongly that it was unlikely
that holders of medical marijuana cards would possess synthetic THC when
naturally occurring THC was both legal for them and much more easily
obtained.108 They also noted that the presence of non-psychoactive cannabinoids
which occur in products made from marijuana should be used to conclude that the
material was made from marijuana.109 Other technicians argued that if they could
not see plant material they should list the results as THC or THC of unknown
origin.110 The Attorney General’s office weighed in in favor of the latter position
which ultimately prevailed.111 The lab reports thus left holders of medical
marijuana cards subject to being charged with a felony when, in fact, the material
which they possessed was a protected marijuana derivative. 
100. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26424 (West 2018).
101. Alina Bradford, What Is THC, LIVE SCI. (May 18, 2017, 7:35 PM), https://www.
livescience.com/24553-what-is-thc.html [https://perma.cc/QXY8-WGW6]. 
102. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7212 (West 2018). The Michigan legislature
subsequently reduced the penalty for synthetic THC to a misdemeanor. Effective January 4, 2017.
103. Lorincz v. Etue, No. 16-12290, 2017 WL 712949, at *1-9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 2017)
(involving a 42 USC § 1983 law suit filed by the defendant against personnel at the crime lab).
104. Id.
105. Id. at *8. See also Exhibit 1, A in that case. The designation “Schedule 1 THC” could be
read as referring only to synthetic THC as naturally occurring THC does not appear in Michigan
Schedule 1. 
106. Complaint at 3-4, Lorincz, 2017 WL 712949 (C.A. No. 2:16-cv-12290).
107. See id. at Exhibit E. 
108. See id. at Exhibit G. 
109. See generally id. at Exhibit H. 
110. See id. at Exhibit B. 
111. See generally id. at Exhibit D-H. The position of the Assistant Attorney General was that
THC was a schedule I felony drug regardless of its origin. Id. at Exhibit E. That position was
contrary to Michigan case law. See People v. Carruthers, 837 N.W.2d 16, 20-21 (Mich. Ct. App.
2013); People v. Campbell, 249 N.W.2d 870, 870-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
2018] MANDATING MEANINGFUL FORENSIC DISCOVERY 655
What turned a technical debate into a potential injustice was the failure of the
lab to report the fact that it had discovered the presence of other cannabinoids
consistent with a marijuana based origin for the THC in question, thus leaving the
impression that there was no exculpatory evidence to indicate that the material
was not synthetic THC.112 When asked for the underlying data, the prosecutor in
the case refused to turn it over pursuant to the rules of discovery, but said that it
would only be available through the Freedom of Information Act.113 What is
notable in this success story114 is that the attorney involved did not use the
discovery available under the Rules of Criminal Procedure to uncover the relevant
information. He used the separate Freedom of Information Act.115 Had there not
been that email chain, the practice of the lab might well have gone unrevealed.
Why were both the Zain and Gilchrist cases unearthed in post-conviction
proceedings and in civil law suits? In wrongful conviction civil law suits, full
civil discovery was available.116 In one of the Gilchrist habeas proceedings, the
court granted “full discovery.”117 In both cases, records of the labs in question
showed discrepancies between lab notes and reports prepared for use in court,
internal inconsistencies in lab documentation, and alterations of records designed
112. Complaint, Exhibit A, Lorincz, 2017 WL 712949 (C.A. No. 2:16-cv-12290). 
113. Id. at 20-21.  
114. The success here is the recovery of pertinent information by the defense. The case against
the defendant was ultimately dismissed because the Circuit Court held that the prosecution had not
discharged its burden of showing the THC was synthetic. Lorincz, 2017 WL 712949, at *1-9.
However, this result was not obtained until after sixteen months of litigation. See Dana Chicklas,
Judge dismissed felony charge against medical marijuana patient Max Lorincz, FOX 17 (Jan. 22,
2016, 10:30AM), https://fox17online.com/2016/01/22/medical-marijuana-patient-max-lorincz-due-
in -cou r t -fo r -f e lon y-ch arges-of-synthetic-thc/felony-ch arges -of -syn th e t ic -th c /
[https://perma.cc/JRE9-V5E8]. The issue was ultimately rendered moot by passage of the bill in
the Legislature reducing the penalty for synthetic THC to a misdemeanor. Joint Clarification on
House Bill No. 5649, Lorincz, 2017 WL 712949 (No. 2:16-cv-12290).   
115. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §15.231 (West 2018).
116. It was Woodall’s wrongful imprisonment suit after his release which prompted the
Kanawha County Prosecutor to seek review of all of Zain’s cases. In re Investigation of the W. Va.
State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div. (WV Crime Lab Investigation), 438 S.E.2d 501, 509, 516-18
(W. Va. 1993) (see findings of fact in the Appendix). Pierce v. Gilchrist, No. CIV-05-1519-C, 2007
WL 128994 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 16, 2007) (In a memorandum Order denying Gilchrist’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Court relied on evidence gleaned during discovery.).
117. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001):
Mr. Mitchell requested and received permission to conduct discovery in this habeas
proceeding. As a result, he obtained hand-written notes taken by Ms. Gilchrist during
telephone conversations with Agent Vick indicating that the agent had conducted two
DNA probes on the samples. These probes showed that the semen on the panties
matched that of Mr. Taylor only, that no DNA was present on the rectal swab, and that
the only DNA on the vaginal swab was consistent with the victim. The results thus
completely undermined Ms. Gilchrist’s testimony. Id. at 1063 [emphasis in original].
656 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:641
to support the fraudulent conclusion.118
Commentators have berated the criminal defense bar for the fact that so many
of these scandals went unidentified at the trial court level.119 In commenting on
the Zain case, the authors of Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science,
criticized trial counsel for not finding Zain’s fraud sooner:
It is also clear that in case after case, defense counsel failed to review the
case notes of the prosecution’s forensic serologists. Even a layperson
would have seen that Fred Zain’s written reports and sworn testimony
were contradicted by his case notes.120
The critique is valid, but misdirected. It is true that the documents in question
were damning, but as we will see below, they would in all likelihood not have
been available to defense counsel.
The alteration of discovery under the criminal rules to permit access to bench
notes, equipment readings and the like is not a panacea for all that ails the state
of forensic science. Some commentators have reservations about whether the
criminal litigation system can address any issue in forensic malpractice.121 The
co-chair of the National Academy of Sciences committee which prepared the
NAS Report122 testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that a new
national agency was necessary to properly address the issue:
Unfortunately, the adversarial approach to the submission of evidence in
court is not well suited to the task of finding “scientific truth.” The
judicial system is encumbered by, among other things, judges and
lawyers who generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to
comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner,
defense attorneys who often do not have the resources to challenge
prosecutors’ forensic experts, trial judges (sitting alone) who must decide
evidentiary issues without the benefit of judicial colleagues and often
with little time for extensive research and reflection, and very limited
appellate review of trial court rulings admitting disputed forensic
evidence. Furthermore, the judicial system embodies a case-by-case
adjudicatory approach that is not well suited to address the systematic
problems in many of the various forensic science disciplines. Given these
realities, there is a tremendous need for the forensic science community
to improve. Judicial review, by itself, will not cure the infirmities of the
118. See WV Crime Lab Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 516-518; see also Mitchell, 262 F. 3d at
1064.
119. CONVICTED BY JURIES, supra note 73, at xvii-xviii.
120. Id. at xviii. On the other hand, counsel must know what to do with reports they do get.
Giannelli, supra note 95, at 45 (“The obvious question for defense counsel is: Where are the results
of the confirmatory test? Were they positive or negative? The right to counsel includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel, which in turns [sic] imposes an obligation to investigate.”)
121. See generally NAS REPORT, supra note 6.
122. Id. 
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forensic science community.123
Judge Edwards is not alone in his critique of the judicial system as a vehicle for
addressing forensic problems. One of the co-founders of the Innocence Project
shares the same view:
This exploration of the types of invalid forensic science testimony that
have contributed to convictions of the innocent provides one window
into failures of our criminal justice system to adequately review the use
of forensic science. That system still has not responded with a full
investigation into most of these known miscarriages of justice, much less
looked into other potentially affected cases or routinely conducted
investigations to ensure accurate dispositions. These cases suggest that
the adversary system cannot be depended upon as an adequate safeguard.
The defense bar lacked the expertise and resources to detect and address
invalid forensic science effectively in most of these cases, and judges did
not remedy most errors brought to their attention.124
Even though the civil litigation system shows much more facility at assessing
scientific evidence, I share these misgivings. It is here that the taxonomy of
problems, outlined above, comes into its own. It is unquestionably the case that
the current system of criminal justice is poorly configured to test the validity of
the claims that various forensic methods have or lack scientific support. In
addition to the reservations that many have about the ability of federal judges to
assess scientific or technical merit in the context of any law suit,125 there are other
forces which make the courts a very limited forum when those issues arise in the
criminal law context. Among these are the monopoly of forensic expertise in the
hands of one side in the litigation,126 and the incentives built into the adversarial
123. Edwards, supra note 24.
124. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 96-97 (2009).
125. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting):
I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is
meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its “falsifiability,”
and I suspect some of them will be, too . . . . But I do not think it imposes on them either
the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.
126. Most crime labs in the country are housed within police agencies. The Houston Forensic
Science Center, which became independent after the scandals detailed above, is one of few which
are not. However, even with the Houston Center, its customers are virtually entirely from the
prosecution side of the process:
HFSC currently receives the bulk of its funds from the City of Houston. The Center also
has fee-for-service contracts with some agencies outside the city. HPD eventually will
be one of many law enforcement agencies purchasing HFSC’s forensic services.
Although the City of Houston is funding startup costs, the goal is for HFSC to become
financially self-sustaining.
FAQ, How is HFSC funded and what are the future funding goals?, HOUS. FORENSIC SCI. CTR.,
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system not to challenge the claims of others practicing in the field.127 This is
coupled with the lack of resources on the part of most defendants,128 which means
that even when experts exist willing to dispute the claims of the prosecution, most
defendants are not in a position to make effective use of them.129  There also is a
bias, betrayed by the case law, which supports the offering of weak prosecution
evidence and is less receptive to the use of forensic evidence by the defense.130
Finally, there is the lack of training of all the lawyers in the system in the
scientific issues which they are called upon to address.131
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/faq.php [https://perma.cc/L3FH-AVFV] (last visited May
19, 2018). It is understandable that defense counsel would mistrust the confidentiality which would
be available from such a facility. 
127. Law enforcement is not alone in being reluctant to bite the hand that feeds it. Unlike the
sciences which support multiple constituencies--medicine, physics, chemistry, biology and the
like—an attack on a prevailing idea is likely to be looked on less as progress than as treachery. See
PCAST REPORT supra note 8, at 14 (“To ensure the scientific judgments are unbiased and
independent, such evaluations should be conducted by an agency which has no stake in the
outcome.”). The report suggested that the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) be
the agency to oversee this evaluation. However, it further suggests that NIST modify its current
approval process to require oversight by a committee composed of scientists “from outside the
forensic-science community.” Id. at 15. It further recommended that the Office of Science and
Technology Policy at the White House oversee a national research and development strategy for
the forensic sciences. Id. at 16.
As the 2009 NRC Report and others have noted, fundamentally, the forensic sciences
do not yet have a well-developed “research culture.” Importantly, a research culture
includes the principles that (1) methods must be presumed to be unreliable until their
foundational validity has been established based on empirical evidence and (2) even
then, scientific questioning and review of methods must continue on an ongoing basis.
Notably, some forensic practitioners espouse the notion that extensive “experience” in
casework can substitute for empirical studies of scientific validity. Casework is not
scientifically valid research, and experience alone cannot establish scientific validity.
In particular, one cannot reliably estimate error rates from casework because one
typically does not have independent knowledge of the “ground truth” or “right answer.”
Id. at 32-33.
128. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), available
at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBY3-LCYH] (“Over 80% of
felony defendants charged with a violent crime in the country’s largest counties and 66% in U.S.
district courts had publicly financed attorneys.”).
129. See Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to
Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 480, 482 (1988).
130. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (“criminal defendants
virtually always lose their reliability challenges to government proffers”).
131. See generally Giannelli, supra note 95. The author excoriates both prosecutors and
defense counsel for failing to identify a blood test as preliminary and failing to ask for confirmatory
results. He argues persuasively that this lack of scientific knowledge results in ineffective assistance
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However, altering the rules would have a number of beneficial effects in
reducing fraud, lack of credentials, and unsound work. The first of these effects
would, of course, lie in providing defense attorneys with the ammunition needed
to conduct an effective cross-examination. Much of the art of cross lies in
exposing precisely the kinds of inconsistences that Convicted by Juries points
to.132 Without that ammunition, fraud is difficult, if not impossible to detect:
The North Carolina debacle once again illustrates the importance of
bench notes. Bench notes are often cited in the crime lab scandals. One
of the most notorious cases involved Fred Zain, the chief serologist in the
West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, who falsified test results
from 1979 to 1989. (In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime
Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 511 (W. Va. 1993).) A forensic
scientist would later comment: “It is also clear that in case after case,
defense counsel failed to review the case notes of the prosecution’s
forensic serologists. Even a layperson would have seen that Fred Zain’s
written reports and sworn testimony were contradicted by his case
notes.”133
But that is not the only benefit of disclosure. Forensic examiners tempted to
commit fraud will be less confident of getting away with it when they know that
their records are subject to disclosure. It is virtually impossible to put together a
fraudulent paper trail which will withstand searching scrutiny for long.134 Another
virtue of disclosure lies in the greater scrutiny, which will be given by
laboratories and prosecutors to records which are too good to be true. In
retrospect, there were warning signs in all the fraud cases. Colleagues in the lab
could not replicate results. West Virginia prosecutors pursued Fred Zain to
Texas135 to test their evidence because no one else could get the results that he
seemed able to produce. Joyce Gilchrist was called “Black Magic”136 because of
her ability to find favorable prosecution evidence when no other analyst could.
of counsel. Id. at 63-64. On the other hand, the Innocence Projects that exist across the country,
which have as their goal the use of science to exonerate people wrongfully convicted of crime,
provide evidence that it is possible to train lawyers in the rudiments of science. Misapplication of
Forensic Science, supra note 3. West Virginia University has taken this task head-on with its
Forensic Science LLM which matches information about law and policy with education in forensic
science. See LL.M. Forensic Justice, W. VA. UNIV., https://forensics.wvu.edu/students/graduate-
students/ll-m-forensic-justice [https://perma.cc/FM48-2NAG] (last visited June 2, 2018).  
132. See generally CONVICTED BY JURIES, supra note 73.
133. Giannelli, supra note 95, at 44 (quoting Walter F. Rowe, Commentary, in EDWARD
CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF
DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xviii (1996)).
134. “O, what a tangled web we weave/When first we practise [sic] to deceive!” SIR WALTER
SCOTT, MARMION (1808). 
135. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div. (WV Crime Lab
Investigation), 438 S.E.2d 501, 512 (W. Va. 1993).
136. Belinda Luscombe et al., When The Evidence Lies, TIME MAG., May 21, 2001, at 39.
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No other technician could keep pace with the volume of Annie Dookhan’s
work.137 She represented that she completed 6,466 lab tests in 2010 when all her
colleagues were snowed under with the burden of court appearances mandated by
Melendez-Diaz and produced far fewer.138 All of these warning signs were
disregarded by both prosecutors and laboratory administrators.139 When the
documents underlying the reports of expert results were not subject to discovery,
prosecutors and administrators lacked incentive to look too closely at their prized
“experts.” But, when the documentation is going to be turned over to the defense,
there is an incentive for scrutiny.
So disclosure of bench notes, instrument calibrations and maintenance
records, and the like would have a beneficial effect throughout the criminal
justice system. Defense investigation and cross-examination would be more
meaningful, experts tempted to bend the truth would not feel that they have a
screen behind which to do so, and prosecutors charged with the obligation to
disclose evidence140 would have a stake in policing their own. The National
Commission on Forensic Science cited a telling case in its defense of the
proposed change in the rules:
The leading neutron activation case, United States v. Stifel, illustrates the
dangers of restrictive discovery. Stifel was charged with sending a bomb
through the mail. The bomb exploded and killed a victim after delivery.
The prosecution’s evidence included the results of neutron activation
analysis, which was used to compare bomb debris (vinyl tape, metal cap,
cardboard mailing tube, and paper gummed label) and similar items
obtained from Stifel’s place of employment. The prosecution expert
testified that the metal cap and tape were “of the same manufacture” and
from the “same batch” one day’s manufacturing production. This
testimony “depends on the existence of sufficient background
information.” Stifel was convicted, and his conviction upheld on appeal.
During his imprisonment, Stifel filed a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), which revealed several things, including
discrepancies about the background tests on the vinyl tape. As a result,
Stifel filed a post-conviction petition, alleging a due process violation —
the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. The district court disagreed
that the expert had misrepresented the facts on this issue, but noted the
misleading character of this information in overturning the conviction.
In short, Stifel was entitled, through FOIA, to more information about the
prosecution’s case after he was convicted than he was entitled to when
preparing for his trial. This material would have been discoverable in a
civil trial.141
137. HINTON REPORT supra note 89, at 63-73.
138. The next highest volume of testing was 3,329. Id. at 63. 
139. Id. at 71-72.
140. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 3.8 (a) & (d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
141. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN FORENSIC EVIDENCE CASES: POLICY
RECOMMENDATION 4 (Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. Oct. 28-29, 2014), available at
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IV. WHAT DISCLOSURES SHOULD BE REQUIRED?
In United States v. Tornquist,142 Magistrate Judge Duffy expressed
dissatisfaction with both parties on a motion to disclose laboratory data and
protocols in a case involving DNA because no one would explain the significance
of the material sought.143 In United States v. Iglesias,144 the majority of the court
expressed concern that material sought in the disclosure motion would be
“distorted and misused.”145 To forestall each of these concerns, I will lay out
generic descriptions of the kinds of information, the disclosure of which, I
advocate. I will also set forth the relevance of that information to the orderly
conduct of an expert witness examination. 
In most instances, the U.S. Department of Justice has already conceded as a
matter of internal policy that disclosure should be made.146
A. Chain of Custody
Material that is subject to expert analysis must somehow get from the location
where it was collected to the person or persons testing it and thence to the
courtroom. With respect to most material subject to forensic testing—blood
samples, fingerprints, hair and fiber, for example—this chain of custody must be
documented because the samples are not sufficiently distinct to be identifiable
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/10/20/draft_on_discovery.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LS6V-G7DM] [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATION].  
142. 2012 WL 2862864, at *1-5 (D.S.D. July 11, 2012).
143. Id. at *3:
Mr. Tornquist never even explains to the court what the nature of the discovery is he is
requesting. The court has no independent knowledge of what an “electropherogram” is
or what it does or shows. Neither does the court know what a “slot blot membrane”or
a “PCR product analysis” is. Not only does Mr. Tornquist fail to explain what the items
are that he is requesting, he also fails to explain how the requested discovery is material
to his defense.
The government states in its response to Mr. Tornquist’s motion to compel that—with
three exceptions—it does not object to the disclosure of records requested by Mr.
Tornquist to the extent the DCI lab has any of the described documents in its
possession. Id.
144. 881 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 1524.
146. See generally Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., for Department
Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memorandum-
department-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/8A39-3BA8] [hereinafter Ogden Memo]; Memorandum
from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., for Department Prosecutors, 165. Guidance for
Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010); Yates Memo, supra note 13; see
discussion supra, note 9.
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merely by sight.147 To qualify for introduction in court, the authenticity
requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 901 must be met through a chain of
custody.148 Disclosing the logs which chart the progress of the tested material will
not provide the opposing party with any information which they will not
ultimately obtain through the in-court foundation.149 However, providing that
material in advance of trial will serve a number of useful and necessary functions.
If the witness or witnesses whom the proponent plans to call did not, in fact,
perform the critical tests, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the criminal
defendant is denied his or her right to Confrontation.150 Advance disclosure of the
evidence logs would permit pre-trial resolution of this issue. 
Regarding the goal of this Article of ferreting out fraud and misconduct, the
logs would disclose evidence which was tested by more than one examiner. The
thread which runs through both the Zain and Gilchrist cases is the fact that other
examiners had looked at the material from which those two drew fraudulent
results and had drawn different, accurate, conclusions.151 An examination of the
logs would have disclosed the fact of repeated testing. 
As with the rest of the disclosures advocated here, the traditional arguments
against disclosure are absent.152 There is little risk that the evidence will be
misrepresented if it is made known to the other side.153 If misrepresentation
147. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (providing that one must call more than one “[w]itness with
[k]nowledge” to lay an authenticity foundation where material is susceptible to material alteration).
148. Id.
149. Unless there is a stipulation to authenticity at least some of the persons handling transfer
of the material must be called to testify. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 213
(7th ed., 2013); 1 MARK S. BRODIN, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901 (2d ed., 2011). 
150. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664-65 (2011).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
152. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY 3 (Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. June 21, 2016), available at https://www.justice.
gov/ncfs/file/880241/download [https://perma.cc/8B4B-2BHD] [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL]:
With forensic evidence, however, these traditional arguments against criminal discovery
lose whatever force they might otherwise have. The first argument fails because “it is
virtually impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be distorted or misused
because of its advance disclosure.” Also, there is no evidence that the intimidation of
experts is a major problem, both because in federal practice, the expert is often a
government employee, and because the evidence can often be reexamined, if necessary,
by another expert.
See also DEP’T OF JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 141, AT 7 (LISTED ON THE NCFS
WEBSITE AS INITIAL DRAFT POLICY RECOMMENDATION IN PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN FORENSIC
EVIDENCE CASES (INTRODUCED AT NCFS MEETING #4)); COMMENTARY ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 67 (APPROVED DRAFT 1970).
FINALLY, SEE FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules- 1974 Amendment (“[I]t
is not likely that such evidence will be distorted or misused if disclosed prior to trial[.]”) 
153. As the dissent points out in Inglasias, United States v. Iglesias, 881 F 2d 1519, 1526 (9th
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occurs at trial, counsel for the government will be able to challenge it. As noted
above, the other party is going to learn about this evidence in any event at trial.
The records are written and in the custody of the opposing party, so they are not
subject to tampering. The records already exist, so intimidation is not a realistic
fear.
Current U.S. Department of Justice policy calls for the disclosure of this
chain of custody material.154 USAM 9-5.001 (C)(2): “[information which] might
have a significant bearing of the admissibility of prosecution evidence.”155 The
Yates memo specifically recognizes that chain of custody logs are contained in
the “case file” which the prosecutor “should provide.”156
B. Bench Notes and Instrument Results
There are two primary tasks of forensic testing. The first is to determine
whether there is a link between material somehow associated with the crime and
material somehow associated with various suspects: DNA or blood typing,
fingerprint comparisons, hair and fiber comparisons, ballistics, etc.157 The second
is to determine the nature of a substance thought to figure in criminal activity:
drug identification, the presence of accelerants in cases of suspected arson, etc.158
Modern forensic testing involves some augmentation of human senses using
equipment which is designed to make appropriate comparisons or
Cir. 1989), “Counsel is entitled to explore any inconsistencies or ambiguities contained in the
notes.”
154. 9-5.001- Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-
other-court-proceedings [https://perma.cc/C7JA-5PFV] (last visited May 21, 2018).
155. Id. 
156. Yates Memo, supra note 13, at 3:
Third, if requested by the defense, the prosecutor should provide the defense with a
copy of, or access to, the laboratory or forensic expert’s "case file," either in electronic
or hard-copy form. This information, which may be kept in an actual file or may be
compiled by the forensic expert, normally will describe the facts or data considered by
the forensic expert, include the underlying documentation of the examination or analysis
performed, and contain the material necessary for another examiner to understand the
expert’s report. The exact material contained in a case file varies depending on the type
of forensic analysis performed. It may include such items as a chain-of-custody log;
photographs of physical evidence; analysts' worksheets or bench notes; a scope of work;
an examination plan; and data, charts and graphs that illustrate the results of the tests
conducted. 
157. Forensic Sciences: Types of Evidence, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/
topics/forensics/evidence/Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/X8KR-VSJA] (last visited June
11, 2018).
158. Id.  
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identifications.159 That equipment may itself perform the test.160 For example, a
gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer is used to identify unknown substances
such as drugs or accelerants. In that case, the instrument has a display or printout
which reflects the result obtained,161 and bench notes record, among other things,
how the instrument was used.162 Or the instrument may augment the senses. For
example, a comparison microscope is used to examine bullets for ballistics, hair
or fiber evidence, finger prints, etc.163 In that case, the instrument may capture an
image of the comparison or the user of the instrument may take contemporaneous
notes of the tests performed.164
Disclosure of these results or notes is critical to uncovering erroneous or
fraudulent claims.165 As the National Commission on Forensic Science pointed
out in its draft memorandum on the issue of discovery, “The lack of bench notes
is often cited in laboratory scandals. The West Virginia, Chicago, Houston, and
FBI explosive unit investigations all found inadequate documentation in forensic
case files.”166 
Had there been a requirement to turn over the spectrometer printouts in the
various drug fraud cases, both the prosecutor and defense counsel would have had
a much better chance of determining that the tests were not, in fact, run.167 It is
much more difficult to fabricate a full paper trail of bench notes than it is to
provide a trial testimony stating a spurious result.168 Had Joyce Gilchrist been
159. Forensic Laboratory Equipment, LABCOMPARE, https://www.labcompare.com/Forensic-
Laboratory-Equipment/ [https://perma.cc/AHB8-2A48] (last visited June 11, 2018).  
160. Id.  
161. For a discussion of the print out from mass spectrometry instruments and an account of
the errors which can occur with such printouts see generally VICKI BARWICK ET AL., BEST
PRACTICE GUIDE FOR GENERATING MASS SPECTRA 1-28 (2006), available at http://www.rsc.org/
images/MS2new_tcm18-102519.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y27F-628Z].
162. For a discussion of proper bench note maintenance, see generally NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH OFFICE OF THE DIR., GUIDELINES FOR SCIENTIFIC RECORD KEEPING IN THE INTRAMURAL
RESEARCH PROGRAM AT THE NIH 1-16 (2008), available at https://oir.nih.gov/sites/
d e f a u l t / f i l e s / u p lo a d s / s o u r c e b o o k / d o c u m e n t s / e t h i c a l_ c o n du c t /gu id e l in e s -
scientific_recordkeeping.pdf [https://perma.cc/DPH2-9NYC]. 
163. The Comparison Microscope, MICROSCOPE MASTER, https://www.microscopemaster.
com/comparison-microscope.html [https://perma.cc/FV8L-VVFM] (last visited June 2, 2018). 
164. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATION, SUPRA 141, AT 15-16. (EMPHASIZING THE
NEED OF CONTEMPORANEOUS NOTES).
165. See generally id. 
166. Id. at 14-15.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
168. CONVICTED BY JURIES, supra note 73, at xviii (“Even a layperson would have seen that
Fred Zain’s written reports and sworn testimony were contradicted by his case notes.”); see also
Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (2001): 
Mr. Mitchell requested and received permission to conduct discovery in this habeas
proceeding. As a result, he obtained hand-written notes taken by Ms. Gilchrist during
telephone conversations with Agent Vick indicating that the agent had conducted two
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required to turn over the notes on the FBI DNA testing in the Mitchell case at the
time of the original trial rather than ten years later on habeas, the fact that the
DNA evidence contradicted her sworn testimony would have come to light in
time to save him from years on death row.169
In order to prepare opposing experts, the original test results—not conclusory
statements—are critical: “All data and laboratory records generated by analysis
of DNA samples should be made freely available to all parties. Such access is
essential for evaluating the analysis.”170  
The Department of Justice has recognized that full disclosure of the
underlying records is necessary.171 
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals172 and Federal Rules of
Evidence Rule 702(d),173 the district court has an obligation to determine whether
the testifying expert has properly applied the relevant methodology. Without the
original test results and bench notes, those methods used cannot be subject to
cross examination,174 impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, or
impeachment by contradiction.  
Bench notes already fall within the class of materials that will, in any event,
be subject to disclosure under the Jencks Act because they are prior statements
of a governmental witness.175 The Department of Justice recognizes that
DNA probes on the samples. These probes showed that the semen on the panties
matched that of Mr. Taylor only, that no DNA was present on the rectal swab, and that
the only DNA on the vaginal swab was consistent with the victim. The results thus
completely undermined Ms. Gilcrhist's testimony.  (emphasis in original)
169. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85, 117.
170. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 23 (1992). 
171. See supra text accompanying note 156. 
172. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
173. FED. R. EVID. 702(d) (“[T]he expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.”).
174. FED. R. EVID. 705 Advisory Committee Notes. Referring to the decision not to require
disclosure of the bases for an expert’s conclusion during direct examination of the expert at trial,
the Advisory Committee says: 
The answer assumes that the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is
essential for effective cross-examination. This advance knowledge has been afforded,
though imperfectly, by the traditional foundation requirement. Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this area,
obviating in large measure the obstacles which have been raised in some instances to
discovery of findings, underlying data, and even the identity of experts.
Unfortunately, there is no current analogue to Rule 26 in the rules of Criminal Procedure.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (b) (2012): 
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as
hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any
such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court
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disclosure must be made in advance of trial.176
Again, we are speaking about records which already do, or at least should,
exist. There is no danger of misrepresentation in the hands of the opposing party.
Again there is no danger of fabrication or of alteration through threats or
intimidation.177
C. Instrument Calibration
As noted above, forensic testing of important types of evidence—drugs,
accelerants, DNA—is dependent on the proper functioning of instruments.178
Accreditation standards for forensic laboratories179 and manufacturers’
specifications180 call for periodic calibration of the instrument or the comparison
of known samples to ensure accurate functioning. A laboratory, which is
shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
This is not to suggest that the Jencks Act remedy of disclosure during trial is adequate. Review
of expert testimony requires advance preparation. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, supra note 152, at 1 (“[T]he Commission expects that ‘reasonably in advance of trial’
will usually mean at least a few weeks before trial and with sufficient time for the defense to
consult with and/or secure expert assistance.”).
176. Yates Memo, supra note 13, at 3 (“Disclosure should be made according to local rules
but at least as soon as is reasonably practical and, of course, reasonably in advance of trial.”); see
also Ogden Memo, supra note 146.
177. DEP’T OF JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 141.  
178. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
179. ANAB, ISO/IEC 17025:2005- FORENSIC SCIENCE TESTING LABORATORIES:
ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS 17 (2017), available at https://anab.qualtraxcloud.com/
ShowDocument.aspx?ID=7104 [https://perma.cc/55VS-4W65] [hereinafter ACCREDITATION
REQUIREMENTS]; LEONARD STEINBORN, GMP/ISO QUALITY AUDIT MANUAL FOR HEALTHCARE
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR SUPPLIERS 402 (2005). 
5.5.2 Equipment and its software used for testing, calibration and sampling shall be
capable of achieving the accuracy required and shall comply with specifications
relevant to the tests and/or calibrations concerned. Calibration programmes shall be
established for key quantities or values of the instruments where these properties have
a significant effect on the results. Before being placed into service, equipment
(including that used for sampling) shall be calibrated or checked to establish that it
meets the laboratory’s specification requirements and complies with the relevant
standard specifications. It shall be checked and/or calibrated before use.
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors accreditation requirements:
A program and procedure for the calibration of laboratory equipment shall include a list
of the equipment requiring calibration, specifications for the calibration laboratory,
specified requirements for the calibration, and the interval of calibration.
ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS, supra, at 14.
180. See, e.g., Mass Spectrometry Calibration Standards, SIGMA-ALDRICH, http://www.
sigmaaldrich.com/life-science/proteomics/mass-spectrometry/calibration-standards.html
[https://perma.cc/D8K3-CNQS] (last visited May 21, 2018). 
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functioning correctly, will have a record of the calibrations performed.181 If
calibrations are not properly and timely performed, the instruments may produce
erroneous results.182
Rule 702(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires proper application of
the relevant methods.183 Without the calibration logs, counsel and the court cannot
know whether this key piece of the methodology is being properly performed.184
The National Commission on Forensic Science called for disclosure of calibration
data in its draft policy on forensic disclosure.185
These records, like those above, already do, or should, exist. A ready standard
of comparison exists which is widely agreed upon within the relevant
community.186 There is no danger of misrepresentation, fabrication, or alteration
through threats or intimidation.187 
D. Laboratory Protocols
Forensic laboratories should have protocols for their staff describing the
appropriate conduct of tests that they perform. The Department of Justice
suggests that these protocols are generally publicly available.188  Whether they are
or are not, these protocols should be disclosed. To the extent that the protocols
are at variance with practice in the field, the disclosure would permit inquiry into
181. ANAB, supra note 179, at 17 (“5.9.1.1 Quality control procedures to ensure the validity
of tests undertaken shall be specified in the test method and the result of each quality control
activity shall be recorded.”) (emphasis added).
182. See id.
183. FED. R. EVID. 702(d) (“[T]he expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.”).
184. DEP’T OF JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 141.
185. Id. (“The results of all forensic examinations, expert opinions, and related case documents
(e.g., bench notes, graphs, electropherograms, calibration reports, etc.) should be subject to
disclosure.”).
186. See policy discussion supra note 179. 
187. See supra text accompanying note 149.
188. Yates Memo, supra note 13, at 3: 
In some circumstances, the defense may seek laboratory policies and protocols. To the
extent that a laboratory provides this information online, the prosecutor may simply
share the web address with the defense. Otherwise, determinations regarding disclosure
of this information should be made on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the
forensic analysts involved, taking into account the particularity of the defense's request
and how relevant the request appears to be to the anticipated defenses.
For example, the West Virginia State Police post their Forensic Laboratory Field Manual
publicly on the web. CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, THE W. VA. STATE POLICE FORENSIC
LABORATORY FIELD MANUAL (9th ed. 2010), available at http://www.wvsp.gov/about/
documents/crimelab/9thmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H3Z-WG4R]. See also Virginia Department
of Forensic Science, VA.GOV, http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/documentation-publications/manuals
[https://perma.cc/AF86-WG2Y](last visited May 21, 2018). 
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whether the methods of the laboratory are reliable as required by Rule 702.189 If
the protocols do conform to reliable methodology, then they will provide a
standard against which the performance of the individual technician can be
assessed.190 In either event, disclosure supports appropriate examination under the
rules of evidence. If the protocols are already publicly disclosed, no discovery
problem exists. If they are not, there can be no objection to turning over
information which is probably accessible under the Freedom of Information Act
in any case.191 The Department of Justice has conceded that a violation of
protocols would be Giglio material.192
The status of laboratory accreditation should be disclosed.193 Accreditation
means that a laboratory has been reviewed for compliance with certain accepted
procedures.194 The Justice Department has committed itself to using accredited
labs wherever possible.195
189. FED. R. EVID. 702(d). 
190. The United States Attorneys Manual, 9-5.1000 recognizes that departure from established
protocols would be Giglio impeachment material. 9-5.100- Policy Regarding the Disclosure to
Prosecutors of Potential Impeachment Information Concerning Law Enforcement Agency Witnesses
(“Giglio Policy), OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-issues-
related-trials-and-other-court-proceedings [https://perma.cc/C7JA-5PFV] (last visited May 21,
2018).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(2) (B)-(C) (2012) (statements of policy and administrative staff
manuals and instructions). 
192. 9-5.001- Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information,
supra note 154 (discussing procedures for disclosing potential impeachment information.
193. The National Commission on Forensic Science recommended to the Attorney General
that forensic science service providers be universally accredited. (Adopted at NCFS Meeting #6 -
April 30 - May 1, 2015) RECONCILED at NCFS Meeting #9 - March 21-22, 2016). DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE, UNIVERSAL ACCREDITATION (Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. 2015), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/477851/download [https://perma.cc/5FPX-4ENH]. On
November 23, 2015, the Attorney General issued directions to the Department of Justice that by
December 2020 all department labs except those conducting digital analysis must obtain or
maintain accreditation and that department attorneys “must use, whenever practicable, accredited
forensic testing entities.” U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Memorandum for Heads of Department
Components, Recommendations of the National Commission on Forensic Science 1 (Nov 23,
2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/799001/download [https://perma.cc/7HQP-
3YM9] [hereinafter the Lynch Memo]. The National Commission also recommended that all labs
undergo proficiency testing. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON PROFICIENCY TESTING (Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. Dec. 8, 2016), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/905566/download [https://perma.cc/TK4P-KJ9M].
The Justice Department has not yet acted on this recommendation. 
194. See generally Forensic Accreditation, ANAB, https://www.anab.org/forensic-
accreditation [https://perma.cc/3B26-BA4F] (last visited June 11, 2018).  
195. See Lynch Memo, supra note 193.  
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E. Expert Qualifications
There should be no doubt that experts seeking to testify to conclusions under
Daubert and Rule 702 are required to disclose their credentials in advance or at
least at the Daubert hearing.196 This is typically done in the form of a written
curriculum vitae.197 The Justice Department has agreed that this disclosure is
required.198 The National Commission on Forensic Science notes that a large
number of forensic witnesses have lied about their credentials.199 It is interesting
that both Zain200 and Gilchrist201 misrepresented, in minor ways, relevant
credentials. If the individual practitioner is or is not certified, that should be
revealed.202
196. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
197. Jim Mangraviti, How to Write a Curriculum Vitae (CV) for Expert Witness Work, SEAK
(Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.testifyingtraining.com/write-curriculum-vitae-cv-expert-witness-work/
[https://perma.cc/H934-GYKE]. 
198. Yates Memo, supra note 13, at 3:
Fourth, the prosecutor should provide to the defense information on the expert’s
qualifications. Typically, this material will include such items as the expert's curriculum
vitae, highlighting relevant education, training and publications, and a brief summary
that describes the analyst’s synopsis of experience in testifying as an expert at trial or
by deposition.
199. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 141, at 17 n.82:
E.g., Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1987) (serologist testified falsely
about academic credentials); Kline v. State, 444 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(psychologist convicted of perjury for claiming he had a doctorate during Ted Bundy
trial); People v. Alfano, 420 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ill. App. 1983) (arson expert testified
falsely about his academic credentials); State v. Elder, 433 P.2d 462 (Kan. 1967) (lab
technician convicted of perjury for misrepresenting his educational background); State
v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ohio C.P. 1978) (lab analyst pleaded guilty to 8
counts of falsification for misstating his academic credentials). See also Michael Saks,
Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI.
772 (1989) (listing other cases); James Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists,
in 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 1, 7, 20-29 ®. Saferstein ed. 1988); Annotation,
Perjury or Wilfully False Testimony of Expert Witness as Basis for New Trial on
Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence, 38 A.L.R.3d 812.
200. Mr. Zain claimed to have minored in chemistry whereas he had only taken a few courses
with little success. Chan, supra note 68. 
201. Ms. Gilchrist testified that she was a member of the American Academy of Forensic
Scientists when her membership had been revoked for non-payment of dues. See Scott Cooper,
Chemist’s colleagues saw warning signs, NEWSOK (May 13, 2001, 12:00AM) http://newsok.com/
article/1057162 [https://perma.cc/XV7T-7PRC].
202. The National Commission on Forensic Science adopted a “views” document on
practitioner certification calling for progress toward consistent certification of all practitioners.
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION CERTIFICATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE
PRACTITIONERS (Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. Sept. 12, 2016), available at https://www.justice.
gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/905897/download [https://perma.cc/9PX9-259D]. This idea did not
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There is also a need to gather any Giglio203 material relevant to the witness.204
F. Communications Concerning the Case
The case file on an examination should include communications between the
expert and others about the case.205 The National Academies of Science Report206
calls for study of human bias in forensic work.
[The proposed agency to oversee forensic science] should encourage
research programs on human observer bias and sources of human error
in forensic examinations. Such programs might include studies to
determine the effects of contextual bias in forensic practice (e.g., studies
to determine whether and to what extent the results of forensic analyses
are influenced by knowledge regarding the background of the suspect
and the investigator’s theory of the case).207
They based that recommendation on existing studies.208 They cite a study
showing that non-task related contextual information influences forensic
conclusions.209 Thus, there have been critiques of the “verification” phase of
fingerprint examinations because the second examiner knows that a previous
identification has been made.210 They also note the erroneous fingerprint
identification of Brandon Mayfield as an example of confirmation bias under
emergency circumstances.211 In the hands of an unscrupulous examiner, the felt
need to support the investigative “team,” will result in deliberate fabrication.212
In the hands of those trying to be accurate, it will provide the impetus to call a
marginal or questionable result in favor of the conclusion sought. Thus,
become a recommendation to the Department of Justice and was never acted on by the Attorney
General. 
203. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
204. See Yates Memo, supra note 13; see also Ogden memo, supra note 146. 
205. See Yates Memo, supra note 13; see also Ogden memo, supra note 146. 
206. See generally NAS REPORT, supra note 6.
207. Id. at 24.
208. See generally id. at 122-24.
209. Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 600, 600-16 (2006).
210. See generally Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects
during the Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology When Conducting Fingerprint
Comparisons 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 571 (2009); Elizabeth J. Reese, Techniques for Mitigating
Cognitive Biases in Fingerprint Identification, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1252 (2012).
211. Robert B. Stacey, Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid
Train Bombing Case, FBI (Jan. 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-
science-com m u n ica t ion s / f sc / jan 2 0 0 5 / spec ia l_ report /2005_special_report .h tm
[https://perma.cc/M7LV-7VXX]; see generally Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation
Bias: Problems, Perspective, and Proposed Solutions 2 J. OF APPLIED RES. IN MEMORY &
COGNITION 42 (2013).
212. See discussion supra Part II.D (concerning instances of forensic fraud).
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disclosure of those communications will be relevant to assessment of the
application of methods used. The Justice Department has agreed to disclose at
least some of this material.213 
G. Summary
These types of disclosures are all clearly tied to needs of the district court to
discharge its responsibilities under the Rules of Evidence and the relevant
Constitutional standards. Adhering to these standards will take a giant step in
preventing forensic fraud.
V. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE REMEDY INADEQUATE
The National Commission on Forensic Science recommended that, “[t]he
Attorney General should direct federal prosecutors” to make appropriate
disclosures in litigation where they intend to offer expert testimony.214 To work
lasting and enforceable change in discovery of materials required to check fraud
and deficient performance, change in the internal policy of the Justice Department
is insufficient. What is needed is a change in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.215 This is true for two reasons: internal policies of the
Department of Justice are not enforceable by defendants or by the courts, and
internal policies are subject to the vagaries of shift in attitudes by the leadership
of the Department.
On the issue of enforceability, we need to look to the status of internal policy
directives. The directives of the Attorney General to the U.S. Attorneys located
in every federal judicial district are embodied in the U.S. Attorneys Manual
(USAM).216 The USAM provides direction on the handling of all of the various
types of litigation normally dealt with by U.S. Attorneys. Title 9 of the Manual
deals with criminal cases and 9-5.000 deals with “Issues Related To Trials And
Other Court Proceedings.”217 No section of the USAM deals expressly with the
disclosure of forensic material. The closest is 9-5.001 which is the policy
regarding disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment information.218 
213. See Yates Memo, supra note 13; see also FED. R. EVID. 702(d). 
214. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 152, at 1. The NCFS has
ceased to function, because Attorney General Sessions failed to renew it in April of 2017. In an
earlier draft, it also recommended that the Department seek a change in Rule 16. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE
POLICY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 141, at 2. 
215. See proposed change starting infra note 326.
216. The USAM is available on-line. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
https://www.justice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual [https://perma.cc/BH69-NS5C] (last
visited May 22, 2018) [hereinafter USAM]. 
217. 9-5.000-Issues Related to Discovery, Trials, And Other Proceedings, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
ATT’YS, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-other-court-
proceedings [https://perma.cc/C7JA-5PFV] (last visited May 21, 2018).
218. 9-5.001- Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information,
supra note 154. The Manual on this topic was last updated in December of 2017. The Ogden memo,
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As Elizabeth Magill points out in her article on “agency self-regulation,”219
the USAM “commits the government to a variety of substantive policies that are
not required by law.”220 The Department is eager to point out that the USAM
guidance is “not intended to have the force of law or to create or confer any
rights, privileges, or benefits.”221 
Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden, author of the section of the
current manual dealing with Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal
Discovery, cites U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Caceres as authority
that the USAM confers no benefits on third parties.222 In Caceres, the Internal
Revenue Service violated its own internal procedure in surreptitiously recording
conversations between one of its agents and a man offering that agent a bribe.223
Over the strong dissent of Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that since
the regulation in question protected no constitutional or statutory right and since
the defendant had not relied to his detriment on the policy, the defendant was not
entitled to the relief of suppression of the evidence in question.224 In doing so, it
distinguished, without discussing, a long line of cases holding that the
government must follow its own regulations and that parties who suffer because
of a failure to follow those regulations are entitled to relief.225 As Justice Marshall
summarized:
In a long line of cases beginning with Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
152-153 . . . (1945), this Court has held that “one under investigation . .
. is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules” promulgated
by an executive or legislative body for his protection. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-696 . . .  (1974); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 235 . . . (1974); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 . . . (1963);
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 . . . (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363 . . . (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.
260 . . . (1954). Underlying these decisions is a judgment, central to our
concept of due process, that government officials no less than private
citizens are bound by rules of law. Where individual interests are
implicated, the Due Process Clause requires that an executive agency
adhere to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. See
Vitarelli v. Seaton, supra, 359 U.S. at 547 . . .  (Frankfurter, J.,
which addressed broadened discovery in response to the Senator Ted Stevens case, is annexed to
the Manual as Resource 165. See infra text accompanying note 310. That memo was issued on
January 4, 2010. Both the Ogden memo and the Yates memo were incorporated into the text of the
Manual in the December 2017 revision. See text infra at notes 250-52. 
219. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 863 (2009).
220. Id. at 867.
221. Ogden Memo, supra note 146. 
222. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
223. See id. at 749.
224. Id. at 744. 
225. Id. at 757-58.
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concurring in part and dissenting in part).226
Marshall points out that the prior precedent does not rely on the existence of a
Constitutional or statutory requirement for the regulation: “This Court has
consistently demanded governmental compliance with regulations designed to
safeguard individual interests even when the rules were not mandated by the
Constitution or federal statute.”227
One way to distinguish Caceres from a case which might arise under the
USAM disclosure provisions is that those disclosure provisions stem from the
constitutional mandate for a fair trial.228 The Caceres Court cited for support of
its holding Bridges v. Wixon,229 which it characterized as standing for the
proposition that the regulations upheld in that case were “designed ‘to afford [the
alien] due process of law.’”230 One could clearly argue that the USAM provisions
on disclosure were designed to prevent due process violations.231 Certainly in
cases where it could be shown that the failure to disclose concealed exculpatory
or impeachment evidence, a violation of the USAM would give rise to
constitutional problems.232 
However, in those clear constitutional violation cases, it is not obvious what
a regulatory violation claim would add to the remedies sought by the defendant
to whom disclosure was denied. The real utility of an independent USAM claim
would arise where the defendant sought disclosure for use in cross-examination
to discredit the expert, not through outright impeachment with a showing of bias
or inconsistent statement, but through some failure of science or method, lack of
proficiency, or of proper documentation. It is unlikely under current materiality
rules233 that a U.S. Attorney would regard material for such a cross as a
mandatory disclosure under Brady or Giglio. 
Caceres has not been overruled by the Court nor has any clarification of the
apparent conflict with the Accardi234 line of cases been forthcoming. Eight
circuits have addressed the issue of the enforceability of the USAM, and all have
held that it does not give rise to a right to enforcement on the part of
226. Id.
227. Id. at 759. He also maintains that individual reliance on the regulation, such as might
occur with the granting of a governmental benefit, had not been previously required as a
prerequisite to the right to invoke the regulation. Id. at 761.
228. See 9-5.001- Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information,
supra note 154.
229. 326 U.S. 135, 152-58 (1945).
230. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749. The Supreme Court does not appear to have further clarified
the line between Accardi, et al. and Caceres.
231. In fact, those provisions were annexed to the USAM in response to the due process
violations which occurred in the Stevens case. See infra text accompanying note 304.
232. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963).
233. See discussion of materiality infra text notes 299-301, 307-20.
234. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) is generally cited as
the leading case on the requirement that the government follow its own regulations.
674 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:641
defendants.235
The preface to the USAM explicitly states: “As is the situation with regard
to other Departmental policies, compliance is expected in all cases but a failure
to comply is not intended to confer any rights on a defendant or another party in
litigation with the United States."236 No circuit has held to the contrary.237
Thus, it would appear that there is no chance of using the USAM as a source
of law to require discovery.238 It is certainly possible, although probably unlikely
absent a constitutional violation, that violations of the USAM might give rise to
employment or ethical violations,239 but such enforcement will not aid the defense
in preventing the kinds of dubious, sloppy, or fraudulent claims that the National
Commission on Forensic Science was targeting.
However, even if the Courts were prepared to compel disclosure based on the
USAM, the contents of that manual are subject to unilateral change at any time.240
Unlike the Rules of Criminal Procedure which require concurrence of the Court
and Congress to amend, the USAM is drafted and reviewed by the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys pursuant to an Order from the Attorney General.241 In
235. See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 497 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing cases);
United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant not entitled to rely on
USAM where the manual stated it did not create any rights enforceable at law by any party); see
also United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 493 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350,
355-56 (6th Cir. 1997); Nicholas v. Reno, 124 F.3d 1376, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Under Seal, 42 F.3d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 800-02 (7th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990); Busher, 817 F.2d at 1411-
12; United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 725 (2d Cir.1984). 
236. See Craveiro, 907 F.2d at 264.
237. A review of the remaining circuits has turned up no case in which the USAM was
enforced to the benefit of a defendant.
238. It is this very lack of judicial enforcement of the USAM which led the Advisory
Committee on the Criminal Rules in 2006 to recommend an amendment to Rule 16 to incorporate
a “Brady” provision. See AM. BAR ASSOC., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 4 (Aug. 2011). 
239. Even in the Stevens case, see footnote 310 infra, the report of the Special Counsel
appointed by the D.C. Circuit Court did not recommend contempt sanctions despite a finding of
intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence. Notice of Filing of Report to Hon. Emmet G.
Sullivan at 514, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS, Document 84 (2012) [hereinafter Stevens Report].
240. 9-27.140 -Modifications or Departures, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, https://www.justice.
gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.130 [https://perma.cc/J7RF-57XQ]
(last visited May 21, 2018). 
241. 28 C.F.R § 0.16 (b) (Order 665-76, 41 FR 46598, Oct. 22, 1976); 28 C.F.R.§0.22 (b)
(Order No. 1413-90, 55 FR 19064 May 8, 1990):
The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, shall be under the direction of a Director.
Under the supervision of the Deputy Attorney General, the Director shall:
(b) Publish and maintain, subject to the general supervision of the Attorney General and
under the directions of the Deputy Attorney General, a U.S. Attorneys’ Manual for the
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addition to disclaiming any intent to create any rights in third parties, it is not
intended to constrain the “litigation prerogatives” of the Department of Justice.242
Thus, the USAM may be revised at any time.
To bring this point home, we need only look at the fate of the National
Commission on Forensic Science itself. As noted above, the action which created
the Commission called for it to be subject to renewal in April of 2017.243 The
members of the Commission believed that important work still needed to be
done.244 Nevertheless, the incoming Attorney General, without explanation,
decided to terminate the Commission.245 The Department of Justice sought public
comment on a replacement vehicle for the Commission.246 Two hundred and fifty-
three comments were received.247 No replacement vehicle has yet been
announced. All of the work product generated by the Commission has been
archived.248 
Before its demise, the Commission made the recommendations discussed
above.249 The then Attorney General accepted the recommendations at least in
part250 and provided a memo from then Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
providing guidance to the U.S. Attorneys on “Supplemental Guidance for
Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery Involving Forensic Evidence and
Experts.”251 The memo was incorporated into the USAM in December of 2017
internal guidance of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and those other organizational units of
the Department concerned with litigation.
242. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 1-1.200 (2018):
The Justice Manual provides internal DOJ guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and
may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed
on otherwise lawful litigation prerogatives of the DOJ.
243. See Memo of Understanding, supra note 11, § VIII.
244. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., REFLECTING BACK–LOOKING TOWARD
THE FUTURE (2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/959356/download
[https://perma.cc/S4ZB-47GH]. 
245. Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New Initiative to Advance Forensic Science
and Help Counter the Rise in Violent Crime, supra note 9.
246. Justice Dep’t, Notice of Public Comment Period on Advancing Forensic Science, FED.
REGISTER (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/13/2017-
07512/notice-of-public-comment-period-on-advancing-forensic-science [https://perma.cc/Q2TY-
96LX].
247. Notice of Public Comment Period on Advancing Forensic Science, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&dct=P
S&D=DOJ-LA-2017-0006 [https://perma.cc/NG4H-7RDZ] (last visited May 22, 2018). 
248. Archives, DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs,
[https://perma.cc/E6ZX-JJ9J] (last visited May 22, 2018).   
249. See Justice Dep’t, supra note 246.
250. See Lynch Memo, supra note 193. 
251. See Yates Memo, supra note 13.
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when the U.S. Attorneys Manual was amended to add section 9-5.003.252
However, it may be as easily removed in the future. 
Because action to alter the internal practices of the Department of Justice is
subject to political change, not subject to review, and provides no enforceable
right to the criminal defendant, the remedy proposed by the National Commission
on Forensic Science is inadequate to address the need for forensic discovery.
What is needed is to embody these recommendations into Criminal Procedure
Rule 16. 
VI. THE CURRENT RULES OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
The current Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16, as written and interpreted,
is not adequate to the task. This section will explore why that is the case. Let’s
start with the clear fact that everything which the NFSC recommendation would
make discoverable in criminal cases is already discoverable in civil matters. We
have seen that several forensic fraud cases came to light only after civil law suits
or habeas corpus petitions were filed.253 The reason for that is in no small part
attributable to the availability of discovery in those proceedings. The standard for
discovery in civil cases is that the material sought is not privileged and is likely
to lead to the production of relevant evidence.254 This standard of relevance does
not characterize criminal discovery. Civil discovery has six main tools:
depositions, interrogatories, requests for admission, requests for production (or
entry on to land), medical examinations, and, more recently, an expanded role for
subpoenas.255 Criminal discovery has a very limited role for depositions.256 Most
of the devices used are akin to pre-defined requests for production.257
The key discovery rule for our purposes is Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. With respect to bench notes, logs, calibration data and the
like, four sections of that rule could come into play. To a much lesser extent, the
252. 9-5.003-Criminal Discovery Involving Forensic Evidence and Experts, OFFICE OF THE
U.S. ATT’YS, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-other-court-
proceedings [https://perma.cc/C7JA-5PFV] (last visited May 21, 2018). That same amendment
elevated the Ogden Discovery memo from supporting material to 9-5.002. This amendment was
made after the representative of the Department of Justice had represented to the Advisory
Committee on the Criminal Rules in October of 2017 that the Yates’ memo was being
implemented. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (Dec. 8, 2017), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/2017-12-08-criminal_rules_committee_report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP4K-
7RPX ] (containing the draft minutes of the October meeting of the Advisory Committee). My
thanks to Professor Sara Sun Beale for alerting me to this amendment.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
255. FED. R. CIV. P. 27-36, 45.
256. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. The rules also require notice of certain defenses. FED. R. CRIM. P.
12.1-12.3.
257. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
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Jencks Act258 has some potential role as well. The terms of these current rules do
not spell out a right to the information we are seeking and the courts have largely
adopted constructions of those rules, which have narrowed their utility even
further.
A. Rule 16(a)(1)(F)
The part of the rule which seems at first sight to be the best fit is 16(a)(1)(F).
That rule provides:
Reports of Examinations and Tests. Upon a defendant’s request, the
government must permit a defendant to inspect and to copy or
photograph the results or reports of any physical or mental examination
and of any scientific test or experiment if:
(i) the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or
control; 
(ii) the attorney for the government knows—or through due
diligence could know—that the item exists; and
(iii) the item is material to preparing the defense or the
government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at
trial.259
Surely bench notes and instrument printouts of test results at least fall under
the rule. It might require a broader reading to include property logs and
calibration test data, but even those are critical to showing that the correct
evidence was tested and that the equipment used in the test was working
correctly.260 
Unfortunately, the two Circuit court261 opinions to address this issue directly
have held that material like bench notes and instrument results are not “results or
reports” within the meaning of the rule. In United States v. Berry, the circuit court
devoted one sentence to the issue: “Under Rule 16(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure appellant had a right to the results or reports of any
examinations, and therefore the personal work notes were not required to be
258. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012), now largely displaced by FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(F).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 146-57, 178-89.
261. See United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Berry,
636 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981). There are also two 10th Circuit cases referencing the rule, but
not addressing this issue. In United States v. Price, 75 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1996) the court cites
Iglesias, but ultimately appears to decide the case on the basis that the motion of the defense was
too general. In United States v. Dennison, 937 F2d 559 (10th Cir. 1991) the court held that delivery
of raw interview notes of the defense psychologist to the government was error because those notes
were not test results. However, it held that error to be harmless. Id. at 566. There are also two 10th
Circuit cases under an earlier version of the rule which made disclosure discretionary with the
court. United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 320-21 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915
(1974); Wolford v. United States, 401 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1968). The current rule makes
disclosure mandatory. 
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disclosed.”262 United States v. Iglesias provides a fuller discussion. Iglesias was
a drug case in which the defense asked for access to the following:
[A]ll documents associated with any scientific analysis of any controlled
substance . . . associated with the prosecution of this case. This request
includes, but is not limited to those records memorializing the storage
and transportation of any such substance . . . .”263
The government responded by providing the defense with a copy of the final lab
report and agreed to let defense counsel talk to the chemist who presumably
performed the test.264 However, according to the opinion “[t]he government . . . 
refused to turn over the ‘log notes,’ protocols, and other internal documents of the
chemists who worked on the analysis.”265
It might be possible to distinguish Iglesias because it would appear from the
defense request and the government response that the actual test results (bench
notes and printouts) were not in issue.266 Rather, it appears that the defense was
seeking essentially chain of custody documentation and the government was
objecting to that, the log records, and lab protocols.267 Although both kinds of
documentation might be important to the defense case, they are not the actual
results of testing which appear to be contemplated by the rule. However, the court
did not confine itself to these issues but swept in bench notes and printouts in its
decision.268
As the court’s opinion goes on to hold, the government did not claim that the
material requested was irrelevant nor that it was not within the government’s
control.269 Rather the government argued and the court ultimately accepted that
the documents sought were not sufficiently formal or final to be considered a
“report” or “result.”270 The court acknowledged that the issue was not clear cut
and that the documents sought might permit the defendant to make a “more
effective defense.”271 But it concluded that the rule was designed to guard against
possible “abuses.”272 The court went on to express the fear that, “unlike the final
reports, the preliminary log notes are much more likely to be distorted and
misused.”273 The opinion does not suggest what the misuse or distortion might be.
The court does acknowledge that the 1974 Advisory Committee notes on this
section of the rule suggest a different conclusion when they make the points that
262. 636 F.2d at 1082.
263. Iglesias, 881 F. 2d at 1521.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1521.
266. See generally id.
267. Id. at 1521-22.
268. Id. at 1523-24.
269. Id. at 1523.
270. Id. 
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1524.
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it is difficult to test expert testimony without advance preparation and that
scientific test results are “not likely . . . [to] be distorted or misused if disclosed
prior to trial[.]”274 In its holding the court simply states:
While we certainly respect defendants’ rights to inspect and copy the
actual results or reports of scientific tests, we are not willing to force the
government to disclose every single piece of paper that is generated
internally in conjunction with such tests.275
The dissent in Iglesias is vigorous and gets to the nub of the matter:
The final report in this case is of no use in determining whether the
testing was appropriate. Only by means of the notes may counsel
ascertain anything about the method and accuracy of the testing. Counsel
is entitled to explore any inconsistencies or ambiguities contained in the
notes.276
It goes on to say, “in fact it is difficult to understand the government’s reluctance
to furnish the information sought in this case.”277
If Iglesias and Berry278 stood alone, they would be troubling precedents, but
they have been followed by district courts in at least three other circuits.279 It is
true that increasingly, trial courts have found ways to work around the precedents,
but they stand unreversed. 
No case under 16(a)(1)(F) has turned on the materiality requirement in that
rule, but it is important to trace its origins here because that requirement has
played such a large role in the cases under 16(a)(1)(E).280 I will discuss the
problems with this provision in that rule below, but it is worthwhile noting here
that the materiality requirement in this part of the Rule, 16(a)(1)(F), was not
authored by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Rules
274. Id.
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 1526.
277. Id. 
278. See generally United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra text
accompanying note 273.
279. In the First Circuit, see United States v. Swartz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107255 (D. Mass.
2012). In the Third Circuit see United States v. Wilson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87908 (D. N.J.
2016). In the Fifth Circuit, there is an appendix opinion: United States v. Ashlock, 105 Fed. App’x
581 (5th Cir. 2004). See supra text accompanying note 272 for a discussion of two Tenth Circuit
cases. A number of state courts have followed this precedent as well. The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, in an appendix opinion has ruled that printouts from testing equipment are clearly
results within the meaning of the rule. United States v. Evans, 82 Fed. App’x 726 (2nd Cir. 2003),
but see United States v. Nelson, 103 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that “notes,
rough notes, investigations, tests and draft reports” were not discoverable but did require the
government to turn over “final analyses and reports”).
280. See infra text accompanying notes 307-20. 
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Advisory Committee.281 As the provision that went from the Supreme Court to
Congress the rule read:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
any relevant . . . (2)  results or reports of physical or mental
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in connection
with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody
or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the
government . . .282
However, the materiality language does appear, without explanation, in the House
Report on the bill that ultimately enacted the Rules in 1975.283 It is my contention,
as I will argue below that the Advisory Committee got it right and the materiality
requirement does not belong in this rule.
However, even without that requirement, the current version of 16(a)(1)(F)
has proven unsatisfactory at producing the disclosures which the NFSC and many
commentators view as critical to combat flawed forensic analysis. Hence the need
for the proposed reform. But before we leave the existing rules, it is worth
exploring three other possible avenues of access to these materials.
281. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F). 
282. 383 U.S. 1097-98 (1966).
283. The rule as proposed by the Advisory Committee and originally adopted in 1965 did not
contain a materiality test. Rather, it limited the results and reports to those “made in connection
with the particular case.” As the advisory notes report:
(2) Relevant results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests
or experiments (including fingerprint and handwriting comparisons) made in connection
with the particular case, or copies thereof. Again the defendant is not required to
designate but the government's obligation is limited to production of items within the
possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or
by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government.
With respect to results or reports of scientific tests or experiments the range of materials
which must be produced by the government is further limited to those made in
connection with the particular case [citations omitted]. Id. (Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules—1974 Amendment).
There was no proposed amendment to this rule in 1974, 416 U.S. 1011, Order transmitting the 1974
proposed amendments, nor did any discussion of this change occur in the 1974 report of the House
Judiciary Committee proceedings. See generally Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. (1975). However, it does appear, without explanation in the House Report on the bill which
ultimately enacted the Rules in 1975. H.R. Rep. 94-247 (1975). It was enacted in 89 Stat. 370. The
committee reports do not discuss this change, but H.R. Rep. 94-247 contains a public comment
from the D.C. Defender Service recommending the change because there might be relevant
evidence in a test done in another case. (I want to thank Nicholas Stump of the WVU College of
Law Library for helping me to unravel this history.).  
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B. Rule 16(a)(1)(E)
Rule 16(a)(1)(E) provides a more generic access to governmental records:
Documents and Objects. Upon a defendant’s request, the government
must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books,
papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or
places, or copies of portions of any of these items, if the item is within
the government’s possession, custody, or control and:
(i) The item is material to preparing the defense;
(ii) The government intends to use the items in its case-in-chief at trial;
or
(ii) The item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.284
The dissent in Iglesias suggested that the discovery sought by the defendant
in that case could be required under this portion of the rule:
Requiring production of testing manuals and instructions appears to
further the purpose of the rule and to come within its scope. The
government has not questioned the materiality of the items requested.
Unless the government shows that the materials are not within its
possession, custody, or control, or shows that they are internal
government documents falling within the exception set forth in Rule
16(a)(2), it would be error for the district court to deny that portion of the
request.285
A number of the lower courts that have departed from Iglesias and required
production have done so on the basis of this suggestion of the dissent and in
reliance on rule 16(a)(1)(E).286 However, as the dissent in Iglesias points out,
there are two potential impediments to successful use of this rule to get at bench
notes, instrument results, and the like.287 The first of these is materiality and the
second is work product.288 We will look at each in turn.
Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) requires that the item be “material” to the defense.289 
While it is not clear what materiality means in the discovery context,290 it is clear
that mere relevance is not sufficient, much less the civil litigation standard of
likely to lead to relevant evidence. The most commonly cited formulation of a
definition is found in United States v. Graham:
284. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(E).
285. United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989).
286. See generally United States v. DeLeon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17811 (D. N.M. 2017);
United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466 (E.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. Zanfordino,
833 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
287. Iglesias, 881 F. 2d at 1524-27.
288. Id. at 1527.
289. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(E)(i). 
290. See infra text accompanying notes 291-93.  
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Under Rule 16, evidence is material if ‘there is a strong indication that
it will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding
witness preparation, . . . or assisting impeachment or rebuttal.’291
However, the court goes on:
Although the materiality standard is ‘not a heavy burden,’ the
Government need disclose Rule 16 material only if it ‘enable[s] the
defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor.’292
It would not be difficult to make a showing that bench notes, etc. might play
an important role in uncovering evidence, assisting witness preparation, or
conducting impeachment or rebuttal. Certainly, if the testing was flawed or non-
existent, that would be admissible defense evidence. If the testing was based on
unsupported scientific claims, the disclosure would aid in supporting defense
witnesses and arguments in the context of the Daubert hearing.293 Or if the bench
notes were inconsistent with the final report (as they were in Zain),294 that would
provide devastating material for impeachment. But how is the defense to know,
before examining the documents sought, that any of these defects will be
revealed?
In civil discovery, there is no requirement, outside the work product context,
to show that the requestor will benefit from the information sought.295 You do not
know; that is why you ask. But for at least one trial court, the materiality standard
has been taken to impose on the defense the obligation to show that the evidence
would be favorable. If the outcome of the discovery is unknown, the requestor
loses, without even being able to see the item he seeks.296 
291. United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1474 (D.C. Cir., 1996) (quoting United States
v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
292. Id.
293. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
294. See supra text accompanying note 116.
295. See generally Discovery: Work Product and Good Cause Development Since Hickman
v. Taylor, 36 IND. L.J. 186 (1961) (“This work product exemption protects the material prepared
by the attorney from discovery except upon a showing of special circumstances justifying such an
invasion.”). 
296. See generally United States v. Caro, 597 F. 3d 608 (4th Cir. 2010). On the other hand,
some courts adopt a standard which simply requires a relationship between the evidence sought and
some proper defense function. See United States v. Zanfordino, 833 F. Supp. 429, 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). Ironically, having created the difficulties described above with its restrictive reading of
(a)(1)(F), the Ninth Circuit has a liberal construction of the materiality requirement. United States
v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016):
Materiality is a ‘low threshold; it is satisfied so long as the information . . . would have
helped’ to prepare a defense. United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th
Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The test is not whether the
discovery is admissible at trial, but whether the discovery may assist Soto-Zuniga in
formulating a defense, including leading to admissible evidence. See id. (“Information
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As the keeper of the vast preponderance of evidence in criminal cases, the
U.S. government has fought fiercely to maintain the materiality standard.297 It
enables the government to effectively say, “I do not believe that the items you
seek will help you, and since you cannot prove me wrong without seeing them,
you lose.”298 
Why do we have such a strange hurdle in criminal cases? There appear to be
three reasons. The first is the fear of misuse by the defendant. Witnesses may be
suborned or worse if they are disclosed. Evidence not within the control of the
government may be destroyed. The defendant may commit perjury. But as the
Advisory Committee pointed out in their commentary on 16(a)(1)(F), these fears
are simply not salient when we are dealing with the kind of lab notes and other
data covered here.299 The government has the evidence. The tests have been done.
is material even if it simply causes a defendant to completely abandon a planned
defense and take an entirely different path.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“This materiality
standard normally is not a heavy burden; rather, evidence is material as long as there is
a strong indication that it will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence,
aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or
rebuttal.” Id. 
297. See statement of Deputy Attorney General James Cole taking the position that no change
in the status quo was required by the blatant withholding of Brady material in the Ted Stevens case.
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, DEP’T
OF JUSTICE (June 6, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-james-m-
cole-testifies-senate-judiciary-committee [https://perma.cc/HP7K-RHHE]. The chief reason
advanced for keeping the initial materiality decision in the hands of the prosecution is fear for the
safety of witnesses. See Kelly A. Zusman & Daniel Gillogly, Getting a Clue: How Materiality
Continues to Play a Critical Role in Guiding Prosecutors’ Discovery, 60 U. S. ATT’YS’ BULL 13,
14 (2012). However, as the Advisory Committee notes on Rule 16(a)(1)(F) point out, discovery of
results and reports do not pose the threats conjured up by the Department. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-56. 
The conviction of former Senator Ted Stevens was overturned because of the failure of the
Department of Justice to turn over exculpatory evidence. An independent investigation instigated
by the trial judge found serious misconduct against the government. See Stevens Report, supra note
239. The trial judge also called for amendment to the exculpatory evidence rules to get rid of the
materiality standard. See Emmet G. Sullivan, Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally-Required
Disclosures: A Proposed Rule, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 138 (2016). It was to head off this
proposed change that Mr. Cole testified.
298. In 1994, the House of Delegates approved criminal justice standards for discovery which
call for disclosure of “[a]ny material which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant . . .” without
reference to materiality. See Criminal Justice Section, Discovery Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii). In 2008,
the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA labelled control of discovery by the government “The
Discovery Paradox” and called for a change in Rule 16. See HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION
105D 3-4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011), available at Https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/Download
Asset.aspx?id=22279.
299. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, Advisory Committee Notes on 1974 Amendment. One of the
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The results have been written down. The witnesses have already been identified
in the final report. The only real risk is that able defense counsel will be able to
use the disclosures to throw doubt on the technician’s conclusion. To the extent
that counsel’s questioning or arguments are improper, the trial court has full
power to control them. To the extent that counsel’s arguments are sophistic,
opposing counsel should be able to meet them. To the extent that the questions
are telling, they should be asked.300
The second reason for a materiality standard might be to prevent discovery
for discoveries’ sake; the use of discovery as a tool of tactical advantage to raise
the costs to the other side in litigation. In civil cases, where much less is at stake
than the liberty or life of the defendant, we have faced this issue and concluded
that more access to information, even with the possibility of misuse, is preferable
to trial by ambush301 or reaching the wrong result because one side has an
information advantage. Here, the risk of discovery leverage is much reduced. The
government can only be asked to produce what it already has. If there are no
bench notes, they cannot be produced. Even the wildest fishing expedition is
going to take place in a very small pond.302
The final reason is that the courts are confusing two different points in the
progress of a case. Materiality in the post-conviction context where Brady and
other cases are located, requires an exploration of whether any error committed
below is harmless.303 We are trying to look behind the judgment of the trial court
to see whether some alteration of the evidence is likely to have made a difference
in the outcome. But that is not the context in which discovery takes place.304 Here,
no prior judgment has been rendered. We are not being asked to rewind the clock.
The issue here is, what will produce a fairer trial from the inception. Is it a
situation in which both sides have access to available information or where one
side has a monopoly? Interestingly, the Department of Justice takes the official,
difficult issues in Rule 16 rules and case law is the frequent renumbering of the rules as changes
are made. The rule discussed as (a)(1)(D) is now (a)(1)(F).
The obligation of disclosure applies only to scientific tests or experiments “made in
connection with the particular case.” So limited, mandatory disclosure seems justified
because: (1) it is difficult to test expert testimony at trial without advance notice and
preparation; (2) it is not likely that such evidence will be distorted or misused if
disclosed prior to trial; and (3) to the extent that a test may be favorable to the defense,
its disclosure is mandated under the rule of Brady v. Maryland[.] Id. 
300. United States v. Iglesias, 881 F 2d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1989).
301. This was Justice William Brennan’s characterization of the state of criminal discovery.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress
Report, 68 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). 
302. For a description of the material sought, see supra Part IV.
303. See generally Robert Pondolfi, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error
Standard, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 616 (1974) (history of harmless error doctrine).    
304. Two courts dealing with materiality in the discovery context make this point. See United
States v. Liquid Sugars, 158 F.R.D. 466, 470 (E.D. Cal., 1994); United States v. Siegfried, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10411 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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but internal position that exculpatory material beyond that required by Brady
should be made available in discovery,305 but fights any proposal to externalize
and make that standard enforceable.
Assuming that we can dispose of the materiality issue, through a liberal
reading of the rule which effectively equates materiality with relevance, we are
left with one more problem in using Rule 16(a)(1)(E) to obtain these reports.306
Unlike the other provisions of Rule 16, 16(a)(1)(E) is limited by a “work product”
like provision. That provision makes undiscoverable “reports, memoranda, or
other internal government documents made by . . . other government agent in
connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.”307 At least one trial court
has held that the kind of documents sought here are proscribed under this
provision of the rule.308 On the other hand, two other trial courts have held that
(a)(2) does not apply in these circumstances.309
So, although a number of courts have granted defense access to the NFSC
disclosures using Rule16(a)(1)(E), that route is plagued with potential pitfalls.
C. Rule 16(a)(1)(G)
Another possible route used by lower courts to grant access to these materials
305. 9-5.001- Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information,
supra note 154. 
306. One creative court avoided the materiality requirement by finding that if documents were
relied on in preparing government witnesses, they were being used by “the government [as
evidence] in its case-in-chief at trial[,]” thus making the documents discoverable under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(ii). See United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629, 635 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
307. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
308. See generally United States v. Wilkerson, 189 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1999). The defense
in Wilkerson asked for written records related to drug testing in the case as well as various lab
protocols. Id. at 15. The court held that other than the results themselves, the other documents were
protected by (a)(2): 
Defendant argues that these documents are “material to the preparation of the
defendant’s defense.” Rule 16(a)(1)(C) [now 16(a)(1)(E)]. However, Rule 16(a)(2) acts
as a prohibition against compelled discovery of “reports, memoranda, or other internal
government documents” even if they could initially be categorized as “material to the
preparation of the defendant’s defense” as that term is used in Rule 16(a)(1)(C). Id. at
16.
Cf. United States v. Cole, 707 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Cole does not lay out the
government theory nor that of the defense, but it excludes from discovery “work papers underlying
scientific tests or accounting analyses” in a context where only (a)(2) would appear to be on point.
Id. at 1002.
309. United States v. Zanfordino, 833 F. Supp. 429, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v.
Bel-Mar Labs., 284 F. Supp. 875, 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Documents of the kind sought by the
NFSC do not contain the kind of “thought process” typically covered by the “work product”
doctrine. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, Advisory Committee Notes on 1974 Amendment (revisions on
rules). 
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is found in Rule16(a)(1)(G).310 That relatively new provision in the rule provides:
Expert Witnesses. – At the defendant’s request, the government must
give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the
government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial . . . . The summary
provided under this subparagraph must describe the witness’s opinions,
the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s
qualifications.311
Two appellate courts have held that such a summary must identify bench notes
and the like as supporting documents.312  It is not clear from either of those
opinions whether the documents need to be turned over or merely identified, but
the requirement would be meaningless if production were not required.313
D. Jencks Act and Rule 26.2
The final approach under the current Rules and statutes to force disclosure of
the NCFS disclosures is found in the Jencks Act.314 That statute requires the
government to turn over to the defense prior statements made by the witness
which relate to the “subject matter as to which the witness has testified,” at the
end of a witness’s direct testimony.315 Jencks has been superseded by Rules of
Criminal Procedure Rule 26.2,316 but this rule remains unaltered. Bench notes at
least would be a prior statement by the technician and thus producible under
310. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G).
311. Id.
312. United States v. Grace, 526 F. 3d 499, 513 (9th Cir. 2008) (tying identification of
“documents or information . . . reviewed in preparing his or her report” to the requirement in Rule
16(a)(1)(G) that the expert report include “bases and reasons” for opinions); United States v. Davis,
514 F.3d 596, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2008), holding: 
We conclude that none of these documents adequately indicate the bases for the
chemists’ laboratory reports; if Davis had hired a chemist, he or she would not have
been able to analyze the steps that led the government’s chemists to their conclusions.
The prosecutors clearly violated Rule 16(a)(1)(G). It was proper for the district court
to request that the chemists provide their notes to Davis's counsel.
The court cites the language of the Advisory Committee notes:
Without regard to whether a party would be entitled to the underlying bases for expert
testimony under other provisions of [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 16, the amendment requires a
summary of the bases relied upon by the expert. That should cover not only written and
oral reports, tests, reports, and investigations, but any information that might be
recognized as a legitimate basis for an opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
including opinions of other experts. Id. at 612.
313. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (setting forth the requirements of a report for an expert
in a civil case.).
314. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).
315. Id.  
316. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
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Jencks. The problem with using this vehicle to obtain this information is that it
is limited to the witness’s statements and thus does not include much of what the
NCFS calls for. Further, the timing of Jencks disclosures seriously compromises
their usefulness because a continuance must be sought to assess the meaning of
the notes and to enlist expert assistance in formulating an appropriate attack
should one emerge.317 
Brady and Giglio would seem to provide some avenue for relief where the
NCFS disclosure is evidently exculpatory or contains evident impeachment
material.318 However, the problems discussed above relevant to the materiality
test infect the jurisprudence surrounding those two cases.319 There is also the
danger that the prosecuting attorney, not steeped in forensic science and lacking
the impetus to learn that competent defense counsel would have, will, in good
faith, miss covered documents. These notes and other documents are not likely
to be in the initial case file so that a prosecutor would have to seek it out, again
without the defense incentive. It is only relatively recently that an obligation to
actually explore the forensic file was articulated by the Department of Justice.320
The upshot of this exploration of current rules, statutes, and cases is to
reinforce the conclusion, which the NCFS obviously drew: that a change in the
status quo must occur to ensure access to this material.
VII. AMENDMENT TO THE RULE
What is needed is an amendment to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to ensure access to the material identified by the NCFS. As currently
written, the pertinent parts of that Rule read as follows:
(a) Government’s Disclosure
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.
. . .
(F) Reports of Examinations and Tests. Upon a defendant’s
request, the government must permit a defendant to inspect and
to copy or photograph the results or reports of any physical or
mental examination and of any scientific test or experiment if:
(i) the item is within the government's possession,
custody, or control;
(ii) the attorney for the government knows—or through
due diligence could know—that the item exists; and
(iii) the item is material to preparing the defense or the
government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief
at trial.
317. Jencks calls for disclosure only after the witness has testified, which makes receipt of this
material largely useless in preparing testimony of a defense expert. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
318. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 290-96, 303-15.
320. See Ogden Memo, supra note 146. 
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(G) Expert Witnesses. At the defendant’s request, the
government must give to the defendant a written summary of
any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules
702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its
case-in-chief at trial. If the government requests discovery under
subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) and the defendant complies, the
government must, at the defendant’s request, give to the
defendant a written summary of testimony that the government
intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence as evidence at trial on the issue of the defendant's
mental condition. The summary provided under this
subparagraph must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and
reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.321
Rule 16(a)(1)(F) (iii) should be amended as follows:
(iii) the item is relevant to the case at issue.
Items falling under this rule shall include, but not be limited to:
(1) records revealing the chain of custody for any material
examined or tested,
(2) bench notes and instrument output reflecting the methods
used and results obtained for all examinations or tests
performed,
(3) records reflecting the most recent prior calibration of any
instruments or other equipment used in the examination or
testing,322
(4) protocols used in the performance of any tests run or
examinations performed,
(5) a statement of the qualifications of any personnel
involved in the examination and testing, and
(6) other materials considered by the examiner in
formulating conclusions regarding the examination, test, or
experiment.
As noted above, the concept of materiality appears to have been introduced
into Rule 16(a)(1)(F) by the House Judiciary committee in an attempt to broaden
the scope of this rule.323 But the concept of materiality has been used by
prosecutors and courts to limit the utility of the Rule 16(a)(1)(E).324 To remove
this threat that a similar fate will befall amended Rule 16(a)(1)(F), the language
of the rule is changed to require the production of any material in the
government’s possession “relevant” to examination and testing in the case at
321. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(F)-(G). 
322. Ironically, a provision requiring disclosure of such calibration is contained in the traffic
laws of New York State. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20(1)(k) (McKinney 2018).
323. See supra text accompanying note 261.
324. See discussion of materiality supra text accompanying notes 290-94, 299-312.
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issue. To expressly reject the precedents in Berry and Iglesias325 and to head off
similar mischief going forward, I propose explicit categories of disclosures. 
As noted above, the current policy of the Justice Department, at least as
articulated in its public sources, calls for the disclosure of most of the enumerated
records.326 Given this agreement, there should not be resistance from the
Department to the amendment of Rule 16.327 However, when Judge Jed Rakoff,
recently of the NCFS, proposed amending Rule 16 to parallel the Yates memo,328
the Department of Justice spoke against the proposal of the ground that the
Department had already implemented these changes internally.329 However, as
discussed above, the DOJ policy is not enforceable by defendants.330 Thus, a
change in the Rule is necessary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This amendment to the Rule will not address all of the problems raised by the
NAS Report. As I have discussed above, there is a discernable taxonomy of those
problems and case by case litigation in the criminal courts is not the best vehicle
to address them all.331 But problems of the persistence of outright fraud and less
culpable error in forensic testing are amenable to correction through this means.
Most obviously, disclosure of critical documentation will help defense counsel
formulate an attack through cross examination and in limine motions to exclude,
on fraudulent misconduct. When counsel have had the ability to discover these
records,332 frauds have been disclosed. 
Less obviously, the knowledge that records will be discoverable will provide
325. See supra text accompanying note 263. Even though courts have acknowledged that the
1974 revision of Rule 16 was designed to increase the scope of discovery, they have been reluctant
to do so. See United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1524 (1989). Therefore, explicit enumeration
of material to be disclosed is necessary.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 146, 154-156, 171, 195-198, 213. But see the fact that
aspects of this policy are not referenced in the U.S. Attorneys Manual. See discussion supra text
accompanying notes 250-57. The only item not specifically covered by the current policy is
instrument calibration which is surely the least problematic of the disclosures required. The existing
policy also calls for a case by case review of correspondence to ensure that no work product is
disclosed.
327. However, resistance can be expected to incorporation of this policy in Rule 16. See supra
text accompanying note 302.
328. See the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules agenda book for its meeting on October
24, 2017 at tab 6B. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES (Chi., Ill. Oct. 24, 2017), available
a t  http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-10-criminal-agenda-book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UKE3-TRW3].    
329. See Draft Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules for its October 24, 2017
Meeting. See generally id. 
330. See supra text accompanying notes 214-38.
331. See discussion supra Part II.
332. In too many instances, these materials were only disclosed through the use of civil
discovery mechanisms in post-conviction proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
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a deterrent to that fraud and sloppy practice. Now an examiner looking to cut
corners or to lie outright about their results can do so with a fair degree of
assurance that no one will scrutinize their conduct or, at least, will not do so until
many years after the fact.333 They might be less willing to stray if they knew they
would face an informed cross-examination based on their own documents. 
An additional deterrent will be provided by prosecutor review of those same
records. This proposed change should cause prosecutors to collect and review
materials which now they have little incentive to examine.334 The knowledge that
these records will go to the defense will provide an incentive to police providers
of testing services to ensure quality.
American courts and lawyers are fond of the assertion by Wigmore that cross
examination is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invested for the
discovery of truth.”335 Even if one is more skeptical, one would have to agree with
Justice Stevens in his dissent in United States v. Salerno et al. that “one must
admit that in the Anglo-American legal system cross-examination is the principal
means of undermining the credibility of a witness whose testimony is false or
inaccurate.”336 
It is beyond doubt that forensic investigation could profit from a major
injection of “truthiness.”337  But any engine needs fuel to run. And the Rules
Advisory Committee has noted in a number of contexts that prior access to
information is that fuel for cross-examination.338
In civil litigation we would reject, out of hand, the effort of any party to
deflect relevant and discrete discovery requests with the assertion that “there is
nothing here to help you, trust us!” 
Prosecutorial Brady review of forensic data did not unearth any of the
scandals discussed above.339 Quite the contrary, prosecutors and police were all
333. It has only been when scandal has arisen that supervisors or special investigations have
looked at many of these instances of fraud. See supra text accompanying note 98. When that
scrutiny has occurred, it has been relatively easy to find the fraudulent conduct. See supra text
accompanying notes 116-17. Had the scrutiny come earlier, many erroneous findings would not
have made their way into the criminal justice system.
334. The only reference to forensic material in the current U.S. Attorneys Manual provision
on discovery, U.S.A.M. 9-5.100, notes that failure to follow forensic protocols would be
discoverable under Giglio. See 9-5.100- Policy Regarding the Disclosure to Prosecutors of
Potential Impeachment Information Concerning Law Enforcement Agency Witnesses (“Giglio
Policy), supra note 190. That provision appears to have been added to the Manual in 2014 (see
introductory notes to the section) A full developed policy with respect to forensic disclosure was
only set forth in 2017 and is not incorporated in the Manual. See supra text accompanying notes
250-57. 
335. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
336. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 328 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. See discussion supra Part II.C-D. Due apologies to Stephen Colbert.
338. See supra note 174 and accompanying text discussing FED. R. EVID. 705; supra note 284
and accompanying text discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
339. See discussion supra Part II.
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too eager to rely on experts who could produce results which were too good to be
true.340
We have a choice. We can reconcile ourselves to periodic scandals, lost years
of innocents behind bars, and the risk to the community when true criminal
perpetrators remain at large. Or we can take a step which the civil practice of law
took seventy-nine years ago. It is time to do what the Rules Advisory Committee
tried to do thirty-three years ago and require meaningful discovery of forensic
testing. It is time to provide some fuel to the engine that is cross examination.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
